1995-10-04 - Re: The Evolution of Cooperation (Towards a mathematical theory of reputation?)

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From: Christian Wettergren <cwe@it.kth.se>
To: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Message Hash: 1c3c57b714d976b81c57223d3b7f286384627190179ac8502ad0e42423352d0d
Message ID: <199510040842.JAA16000@piraya.electrum.kth.se>
Reply To: <ac97b7d503021004c5f9@DialupEudora>
UTC Datetime: 1995-10-04 08:45:49 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 4 Oct 95 01:45:49 PDT

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From: Christian Wettergren <cwe@it.kth.se>
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 95 01:45:49 PDT
To: norm@netcom.com (Norman Hardy)
Subject: Re: The Evolution of Cooperation (Towards a mathematical theory of reputation?)
In-Reply-To: <ac97b7d503021004c5f9@DialupEudora>
Message-ID: <199510040842.JAA16000@piraya.electrum.kth.se>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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| I highly recommend Axelrod's short book, The Evolution of  Cooperation, for
| those (like me) who find it hard to think clearly about trust issues. You
| have probably heard about prisoner's dilemma, tit-for-tat etc. Axelrod is a
| very early worker in this field. He set up a tournament of programmed bugs
| that competed with each other in an artificial environment. They could
| survive only by cooperation with other bugs. The could also cheat.

I vaguely remember that Axelrod did a few interesting additional papers,
on things like geographical propagation of knowledge in iterated 
prisoner's dilemma, and of behaviour in which the 'bugs' had limited memory
as well.

Very interesting reading, I'd say. Do anyone know what he have done recently?

-Christian





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