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1995-11-09 - Re: PGP Comment feature weakens remailer security

Header Data

From: “Perry E. Metzger” <perry@piermont.com>
To: Raph Levien <raph@cs.berkeley.edu>
Message Hash: 073358e9cb3cbbcb0be63fd028538834b2e25763c4da7f519ab8d99d1cd81f34
Message ID: <199511091413.JAA15288@jekyll.piermont.com>
Reply To: <199511090147.RAA31271@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1995-11-09 14:34:33 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 9 Nov 1995 22:34:33 +0800

Raw message

From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 1995 22:34:33 +0800
To: Raph Levien <raph@cs.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: PGP Comment feature weakens remailer security
In-Reply-To: <199511090147.RAA31271@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <199511091413.JAA15288@jekyll.piermont.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Raph Levien writes:
> > I think you are fine if the odds of corrupting the message are less than 
> > the odds of getting hit by a a falling meteor while running the program. 
> > In general there is little point in making any one part of the system 
> > many orders of magnitude more reliable than any other part.
> 
> I agree entirely. That's why my PGP key at school is 382 bits. It's a
> lot easier to compromise my machine than factor a 382 bit number.

On the other hand, it costs nothing by most people's standards to use
a 1024 bit key, so why not use one? I find that there is only a point
in using low security for anything in particular when there is a
perceivable cost to it -- if the cost is typing a different number
while doing key generation, I don't see why one should suffer the
tradeoff.

Perry

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