1995-11-14 - Re: Who needs time vaults anyway?

Header Data

From: Kevin L Prigge <klp@gold.tc.umn.edu>
To: bryce@colorado.edu
Message Hash: 07d8f0f42793b7568490e91f29f233ee48685e7b1a6871d56ded9ee75ce41801
Message ID: <30a4ebe65774002@noc.cis.umn.edu>
Reply To: <199511110715.AAA21835@nagina.cs.colorado.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1995-11-14 00:13:19 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 14 Nov 1995 08:13:19 +0800

Raw message

From: Kevin L Prigge <klp@gold.tc.umn.edu>
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 1995 08:13:19 +0800
To: bryce@colorado.edu
Subject: Re: Who needs time vaults anyway?
In-Reply-To: <199511110715.AAA21835@nagina.cs.colorado.edu>
Message-ID: <30a4ebe65774002@noc.cis.umn.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


According to rumor, Bryce said:
> 
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
> I don't really understand the use for "can't be opened until
> Christmas" tricks.  If you don't want anyone to see your info until
> Christmas then just don't give them a copy until then!  If you want
> to prove that you have it but not let them see it until later then
> do timestamping of hashes, zero-knowledge proofs and so forth.
> 
> 
> Can anyone explain what use this theoretical "time-sensitive" crypto
> box would be good for?

An application that I've seen is financial data, more specifically
MBS payment info. There is 100s of megabytes of data, and it was
encrypted so that nobody could use the info before the release
date/time, but the data needed to be transmitted prior to release
because of bandwidth constraints. In this case, it wasn't real
time-release, because the key was manually transmitted to release
the information rather than implement some sort of "do not decrypt
until" scheme.


-- 
Kevin L. Prigge        |"A computer lets you make more mistakes faster 
UofM Central Computing | than any invention in human history--with the 
email: klp@cis.umn.edu | possible exceptions of handguns and tequila."
01001101100010110010111|- Mitch Ratcliffe





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