From: “Beavis B. Thoopit” <beavis@bioanalytical.com>
To: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Message Hash: 324cc6b4a6e58dd5ca2c25d07d504bc7f563dac29102acec418c863ace06a188
Message ID: <199511091852.NAA01172@bioanalytical.com>
Reply To: <199511091621.QAA01045@orchard.medford.ma.us>
UTC Datetime: 1995-11-09 19:37:30 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 10 Nov 1995 03:37:30 +0800
From: "Beavis B. Thoopit" <beavis@bioanalytical.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 1995 03:37:30 +0800
To: sommerfeld@orchard.medford.ma.us (Bill Sommerfeld)
Subject: Re: Timed-release crypto and information economics
In-Reply-To: <199511091621.QAA01045@orchard.medford.ma.us>
Message-ID: <199511091852.NAA01172@bioanalytical.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> That's a pretty large number of assumptions:
>
> tamper-proof delay line
> => tamper-proof crypto box ("transformation function with state")
> => tamper-proof delay line
>
> Why not just put a tamper-proof clock in the tamper-proof crypto box
> and not bother with the delay lines?
The tamper proof aspect is really secondary to the math question.
The idea that if I set up a stream of bits through a transform, that
the original state of the transform affects the final outcome after
N iterations.
If the transform exists, it will ease/eliminate the reliance on the
"economics" of cryptography to build a tamper-proof physical device.
Here is another implementation of the idea:
initialize buffer to '12#fjKL3_*(ASDdj1ll3_13 asdfasd-1-3!#!23'
do forever /* actually until the plaintext spews out */
sleep 1 unit
for each element in the buffer
buffer[ element ] = magictransform( buffer[ element ] )
The initial buffer must be secret!
Calculating the intial buffer in such a way that after N iterations
the plaintext message appears is what must happen.
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