1995-11-26 - Re: Cypherpunk Certification Authority

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From: anonymous-remailer@shell.portal.com
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: a6444b1d4f4b9ab54d21580fcd0930b6d1410d03bcc41e6c020da6f459f4dd71
Message ID: <199511260953.BAA10105@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-11-26 10:00:44 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 26 Nov 1995 18:00:44 +0800

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From: anonymous-remailer@shell.portal.com
Date: Sun, 26 Nov 1995 18:00:44 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Cypherpunk Certification Authority
Message-ID: <199511260953.BAA10105@jobe.shell.portal.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Sat, 25 Nov 1995, Adam Shostack wrote:

> 	Does X.509 version 3 fix the problem that Ross Anderson points
> out in his 'Robustness Principles' paper? (Crypto '95 proceedings, or
> ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/robustness.ps.Z)
> 
> 	Its an excellent paper, well worth reading, but the basic
> problem is that X.509 encrypts before signing.

You'd rather sign before encryption??

Doesn't that give you "known plain-text" to attack?  i.e. the signature.

I'm not sure whether it would or wouldn't, but I'm sure some
cryptographers here might clear that up mighty quick -- before any more
harm is allowed, I mean. 

> Adam
> 
> -- 
> "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
> 					               -Hume


Alice de 'nonymous ...

                                  ...just another one of those...


P.S.  This post is in the public domain.
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