1995-11-08 - Re: Photuris Primality verification needed

Header Data

From: Hilarie Orman <ho@cs.arizona.edu>
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Message Hash: a9d87d3e6d27886927506b81900b25fa62f674d0938ca857cf33f6b1f65c749e
Message ID: <9511080214.AA12812@uncial.CS.Arizona.EDU>
Reply To: <199511080146.RAA22568@servo.qualcomm.com>
UTC Datetime: 1995-11-08 02:14:26 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 7 Nov 95 18:14:26 PST

Raw message

From: Hilarie Orman <ho@cs.arizona.edu>
Date: Tue, 7 Nov 95 18:14:26 PST
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Subject: Re: Photuris Primality verification needed
In-Reply-To: <199511080146.RAA22568@servo.qualcomm.com>
Message-ID: <9511080214.AA12812@uncial.CS.Arizona.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


>  Well, since we already require 56-bit DES in ESP in the interests of
>  promoting basic interoperability, wouldn't a 512-bit prime be
>  similarly sufficient?

If you are willing to accept that in all likelihood, one year from
now, some group will announce that can "crack" all key exchanges that
using the published modulus, then sure, call it sufficient.  There is
certainly precedent; it was my understanding that Sun did not change
their SecureRPC modulus when informed of LaMacchia and Odlyzko's work.





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