From: shields@tembel.org (Michael Shields)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: c6d858947ffa3e6af36eecb7d836f6771fd92eeab20125cb167546f9cba553da
Message ID: <483lqg$1kt@yage.tembel.org>
Reply To: <v02120d05accab753260f@[199.0.65.105]>
UTC Datetime: 1995-11-12 02:25:29 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 11 Nov 95 18:25:29 PST
From: shields@tembel.org (Michael Shields)
Date: Sat, 11 Nov 95 18:25:29 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Who needs time vaults anyway?
In-Reply-To: <v02120d05accab753260f@[199.0.65.105]>
Message-ID: <483lqg$1kt@yage.tembel.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
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In article <v02120d05accab753260f@[199.0.65.105]>,
Robert Hettinga <rah@shipwright.com> wrote:
> In the real world, there's a trustee/nominee of some sort who does this.
> What's that to keep that from happening on the net, just like our much
> maligned (guy's gotta make a living, fer chrissake!) assassination-payoff
> escrow agent...
Note that with event-release crypto, the houses could make a public key
available, with the secret key to be held until the death of Tom Target.
That key pair could be used by any of its anonymous buyers while the
crypto house remained ignorant not only of the content and authorship
of the messages, but even of the messages' existance -- nothing at all
to subpoena. The same key could be used by Tom to encrypt his will, by
the assassin's employer to encrypt the payment, and by anyone to place
a bet on whether Tom will die within a certain period of time (by using
ecash that expires, like Digicash).
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--
Shields.
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