1995-11-25 - Re: Cypherpunk Certification Authority

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From: Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org>
To: froomkin@law.miami.edu (Michael Froomkin)
Message Hash: ee7d7e3e033c9d168d494465b594f78394381eb4763cc9fffa1469153b752641
Message ID: <199511252105.QAA08724@homeport.org>
Reply To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.951125150446.848J-100000@viper.law.miami.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1995-11-25 21:09:38 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 26 Nov 1995 05:09:38 +0800

Raw message

From: Adam Shostack <adam@lighthouse.homeport.org>
Date: Sun, 26 Nov 1995 05:09:38 +0800
To: froomkin@law.miami.edu (Michael Froomkin)
Subject: Re: Cypherpunk Certification Authority
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SUN.3.91.951125150446.848J-100000@viper.law.miami.edu>
Message-ID: <199511252105.QAA08724@homeport.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



| C) Don't settle for less than X.509 ver 3, because this allows the 
| certificate to carry within it a reference to the location of the CRL 
| list.  Use that feature.

	Does X.509 version 3 fix the problem that Ross Anderson points
out in his 'Robustness Principles' paper? (Crypto '95 proceedings, or
ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/robustness.ps.Z)

	Its an excellent paper, well worth reading, but the basic
problem is that X.509 encrypts before signing.

Adam

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume






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