From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 2 Dec 1995 23:25:28 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Info Foes
Message-ID: <199512021516.QAA15201@utopia.hacktic.nl>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



URL: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/z1106.html


   Strategic Forum
   
                      THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
                                       
   Martin Libicki, CDR James Hazlett, et al.

[Excerpts]
       
  DISCUSSION I: STRATEGIC CHALLENGES
  
   Those who assess future strategic challenges tend to look to 
Asian
   countries, and to categorize competitors as peer, regional, 
or niche.
   
    Asia and the Nation-State
    
    Most conference participants believe that, over the next 
twenty
   years, the fulcrum of world politics will continue to shift 
from
   Europe and its peripheries to the Asia-Pacific region. The 
period of
   European dominance produced innumerable wars as various 
countries
   challenged each other for power, resources, and sovereignty. 
With the
   formation of the European Union and the dissolution of the 
Warsaw
   Pact, great power rivalry in particular and the nation-state 
in
   general are fading somewhat in importance.
   
   The nation-state remains strong in Asia, however. The last 
fifty years
   have seen considerable economic progress as various nations 
have made
   themselves richer by grasping the secrets of rapid 
industrialization.
   This trend, which started in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, 
spread to
   the Tigers in the 1970s, ASEAN countries in the 1980s, and 
China and
   perhaps India in the 1990s, has left no Asian country 
unaffected.
   Economic growth, however, has not made the nation-state 
obsolete. To
   the contrary, the nation-state has been instrumental in 
creating the
   internal and external conditions for economic growth. 
European history
   suggests that countries, once they taste wealth, will 
struggle for
   power. Will Asian countries follow that pattern or 
demonstrate new
   models of what the nation-state is capable of? ...
   
    Types of Competitors
    
   One taxonomy of future threats suggested at the conference 
is to
   classify potential competitors as peer, regional, or niche. 
A peer
   competitor could challenge our military across the board. A 
niche
   competitor would be incapable of doing so, but would strive 
to inhibit
   or defeat U.S. intervention by developing capabilities such 
as
   primitive weapons of mass destruction, sensor blinders, 
physical
   terrorism, information system attacks, psychological 
operations, or
   hostage maneuvers. ...
   
  DISCUSSION II: OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES
  
   Considerable evidence suggests that commercial access to 
information
   -- GPS readings, space-based imagery, and Internet data -- 
could be
   transformed into military advantage thereby levelling the 
playing
   field between ourselves and our potential opponents. Other 
dual-use
   technologies, for instance, those that would permit remote 
piloting of
   aerial vehicles, permit commercial technologies such as 
electronic
   video photography to act as powerful military tools 
accessible to all
   (RPVs are made in more than thirty countries).
   
    Technologies That Level the Field
    
   Does the proliferation in information technologies 
necessarily negate
   our current military lead? Information-based warfare creates 
new
   vulnerabilities for industrial-age institutions slow to 
adapt. Because
   most U.S. logistics facilities and command nodes are not 
well hidden,
   they are vulnerable to precision strike. The widespread 
availability
   of overhead imagery coupled with GPS integration into weapon 
systems--
   no more than a few years away for countries such as 
India--poses a
   serious threat to which our improving defensive measures 
(e.g.,
   anti-tactical ballistic missiles) will provide only a 
partial solution
   
   . Our own counter-C2 operations are complicated by the 
rapidly falling
   cost of bandwidth and redundancy. Even if 90 percent of a 
bit flow can
   be interdicted, the remaining 10 percent may suffice for 
operational
   uses. Rapid expansion of cellular nodes, particularly 
through
   exploitation of commercial space assets, may make targeting 
and
   communications denial difficult or impossible. Multiple 
channels of
   electronic access will also complicate psychological 
operations and
   countermeasures.
   
    With the advent of the global information infrastructure, a 
clever
   adversary could take advantage of open information systems 
to enhance
   its own communications, information, navigation, 
intelligence, and
   operational support: examples include GPS, one-meter 
imagery, weather
   data, and even CNN. Every year more information with 
potential
   military use can be gleaned by anyone from the Internet 
without
   leaving fingerprints. How easily can a country's access to 
the global
   satellite communications networks be blocked? The coming 
global
   information infrastructure will have many points of entry. 
It will
   also be difficult to curtail certain services (e.g., global
   navigation) without denying them to U.S. users or even our 
own
   national security establishment.
   
    Technologies that Keep Us Ahead
    
   The United States, nevertheless, retains an edge in two 
important
   areas: space and systems integration. Space systems are 
relatively
   difficult to build and although many potential middle-income
   adversaries can borrow space services from third parties, 
fewer can
   own satellites, and far fewer can launch them. Thus the 
United States
   will retain a clear edge in the size and sophistication 
(timeliness
   and interpretation) of space capabilities, in their adoption 
and
   adaptation for military uses, in their augmentation or 
adaptation for
   the particulars of future contingencies, and in the 
assurance of their
   continuity.
   
   The distinctions between data and information, and between 
information
   and knowing could also favor U.S. forces. There are vast 
differences
   between, for instance, access to meteorological imagery and
   determining, for instance, that a locus of operations is 
likely to be
   fogged in 24 hours hence (a distinction relevant to the 
Falklands
   campaign). The art of operational planning is not acquired
   automatically with the acquisition of computers. Similarly, 
as sensors
   proliferate in type as well as numbers, data fusion is 
likely to
   become more decisive in future conflicts. ...

   
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

    Two conference threads merit further examination:

     * U.S. defense policies that make it more difficult for 
potential
       competitors to threaten their neighbors and hold off the 
United
       States at the same time may be worth pursuing for that 
fact alone.

     * If militarily relevant information technologies are 
everywhere,
       sophistication at using them may be a better predictor 
of how
       challenging a competitor may become for the United 
States.
       Therefore, in addition to worrying about how large 
future foes are
       (and sizing our own forces accordingly), we should also 
focus on
       the potential sophistication of our foes (and develop 
doctrine
       accordingly).