From: “W. Kinney” <kinney@bogart.Colorado.EDU>
To: mab@research.att.com (Matt Blaze)
Message Hash: 6a1287eeea84951f566d1fa86a0c12b5b7bcb2b763e7bc19e02f9c439b28faac
Message ID: <199512140448.VAA18190@bogart.Colorado.EDU>
Reply To: <199512140032.TAA27224@nsa.tempo.att.com>
UTC Datetime: 1995-12-14 09:43:36 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 14 Dec 1995 17:43:36 +0800
From: "W. Kinney" <kinney@bogart.Colorado.EDU>
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 1995 17:43:36 +0800
To: mab@research.att.com (Matt Blaze)
Subject: Re: CryptoLib 1.0 now available
In-Reply-To: <199512140032.TAA27224@nsa.tempo.att.com>
Message-ID: <199512140448.VAA18190@bogart.Colorado.EDU>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> CryptoLib includes the following:
[...]
> quantization (Defense against Kocher's timing attack)
> quantized RSA, DSA and El Gamal private key operations.
Maybe this is an incorrect conclusion, but here seems to be a _second_ group
who knew about Kocher's timing attack before Kocher did. What on earth
would ECash or ATT have to gain by keeping such knowledge a secret?
-- Will
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