From: Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com>
To: gibo@ripco.com (Giles Bowkett)
Message Hash: 8dfe12ada95ead38e574b62406be5be4d17b64b184e4a3f047bc708935c27f84
Message ID: <199512120729.XAA21395@ix12.ix.netcom.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-12-12 08:52:15 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 12 Dec 1995 16:52:15 +0800
From: Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 1995 16:52:15 +0800
To: gibo@ripco.com (Giles Bowkett)
Subject: Re: Timing Attack Paper
Message-ID: <199512120729.XAA21395@ix12.ix.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 09:39 PM 12/11/95 CST, gibo wrote:
>I went to
>
>http://www.cryptography.com/timingattack.html
>
>and found the whole thing to be totally incomprehensible from
>a layman's point of view. I apologize for having not read
>"Applied Cryptography", which might have made the abstract a
>simpler read - but even if I had I'd have been baffled by a
>lot of the terminology and equations in this paper.
>
>Can anyone post a brief summary which explains the essential
>workings of the attack? I'd be very grateful.
Briefly, most public-key calculations are _slow_, and use
512-2048-bit numbers which get represented as arrays of
machine integers. The amount of time they take depends on the values
you're multiplying together, especially because the algorithms
used to do the arithmetic less slowly take shortcuts whenever
possible to avoid unnecessary work. If you watch the time
that it takes for a machine to do calculations using its private
keys, for some algorithms you can guess a bit or two of the key.
If you're clever, and have the ability to feed the victim
different numbers for it to calculate on (e.g. make a bunch
of connections using Diffie-Hellman), you can guess different
bits each time, and gradually get the whole thing.
It helps to watch this a number of times to get better statistics,
so you can tell what's real calculation and what's just speed-randomness.
Obviously, it also helps if you're running a program on the same
machine as the target you're trying to hit, but you can still gain
some information if you're running across a network and having to
estimate random network delays. In these cases, you just have to
watch longer to get stats.
A common algorithm for doing modular exponentiation (the core
of the Diffie-Hellman and RSA algorithms) looks like this:
To calculate y**x mod m (all this arithmetic is multiple-precision)
(and maybe there's an off-by-one error or two in this :-)
This uses successive squaring to do the calculation in log2(x) time
instead of just doing x multiplies by y, which would be very slow
since x is typically 500-1000 bits long... Remember that
multiplying two 1024-bit numbers typically involves multiplying two
arrays of 32 numbers 32 bits long, which takes 32*32 or 1024 multiply steps.
And modulo calculations are also slow.
prod = 1
square = y
log2x = number of bits in x
for i = 1 to log2x+1 {
if (x odd) then {
prod = prod * square
if ( prod > m ) then prod = prod mod m
}
# else if (x even), don't bother
square = square * square
if (square > m) square = square mod m
x = x / 2
}
You can figure out the timing for the squaring calculations yourself.
Since you get to pick y, you can manipulate it to guess a bit about
how long x is, and notice from the different timings how many
times there was a prod*square calculation (which tells you how many
bits were odd), as well as how many prod mod m calculations.
You can get a certain amount of defense by keeping around prod1 and prod2,
and calculating prod1 = prod1 * square (the real value) for odd
and prod2 = prod2 * square (a dummy you'll discard later) for even,
and doing something useful to obscure the mod m calculations,
like keeping a dummy around to divide if prod1 or prod2 is less than m.
Aside from slowing things down by 50%, if you're not careful, there's
still information that leaks from the timing.
For other algorithms, sometimes the calculations you've got to do timings
on are more subtle, like DES, but you can still often guess things,
and Paul gives a bunch of calculations for these. They're more statistical,
since the effects you're chasing are subtler, but you still get information.
#--
# Thanks; Bill
# Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts@ix.netcom.com
# Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281
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1995-12-12 (Tue, 12 Dec 1995 16:52:15 +0800) - Re: Timing Attack Paper - Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com>