From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 3 Dec 1995 00:41:30 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Four Info Threats
Message-ID: <199512021625.RAA16934@utopia.hacktic.nl>
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URL: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum35.html


   Forum, Number 35, July 1995
   
 
                               THE NEXT ENEMY
                                       
   Martin C. Libicki, National Defense University

[Excerpts]
   
   The Cold War offered military planners considerable 
strategic clarity
   the threat was known, and the problem was generating a force 
structure
   of sufficient size and sophistication to counter it. Today's 
military
   threats are varied and, for the most part, well below the 
level that
   even a shrinking U.S. force can handle comfortably. Threats 
ten to
   twenty years out, however, must be taken seriously because 
of the long
   time required to complete a major systems acquisition; to 
develop,
   test, and institutionalize new doctrine; and to accomplish 
the
   organizational innovations necessary to use both 
effectively.
   
   Future threats may be divided into four categories: peers, 
bullies,
   terrorism, and chaos. ...
   
   Peers
   
   Few planners think it likely that the next twenty years will 
see a
   reemergence of a nation that can pose a challenge to U.S. 
military
   power as broadly as the Soviet Union did. However, at least 
two
   countries (Russia and China) could conceivably be peer 
adversaries at
   the strategic level of nuclear weapons, space, and 
information
   systems.  ...
   
   Another avenue of future competition may be information 
warfare. Can
   or should the United States hold other nations' 
participation in the
   world economy at risk? The United States might be able to 
shut down
   another nation's banking system but not without risk of 
collateral
   damage to the global banking system. Can physical war be 
replaced by a
   survival contest among rival information systems under 
attack? Perhaps
   the United States should concentrate on developing defensive 
systems.
   The United States has the biggest stones, but also the most 
glass in
   its house. ...
   
   A world of peer strategic competition would drive the 
military in
   familiar directions towards: nuclear forces, satellites and 
other
   long-range warning systems; tactical ballistic missile 
defense systems
   (including for allies); perhaps strategic defense systems 
and space
   attack systems; air defense in general; information warfare 
and
   security; and robust command-and-control.
   
   Bullies
   
   If the circumstances and logic of the Bottom Up Review hold 
true for
   two more decades, U.S. armed forces will be sized and 
structured
   primarily to engage in two simultaneous major regional 
contingencies
   (MRCs). The usual suspects in such MRCs (e.g., Iran, Iraq, 
North
   Korea) are presently unsophisticated rogue states that 
aspire to
   nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Conference 
participants believe
   that U.S. forces could cope with the challenges of future 
conventional
   warfare, even if force levels continue to diminish. However, 
two
   events would make the United States rethink its strategy 
nuclear
   weapons proliferation, and the sophisticated exploitation of 
world
   technology markets. ...
   
   Alternatively, an MRC opponent may be able to avoid going to 
the
   nuclear threshold by a strategy which uses smart munitions, 
commercial
   command-and-control, and a variety of surveillance 
technologies (e.g.,
   unmanned aerial vehicles, third-party satellite 
surveillance) to exact
   damaging casualties on U.S. forces. ...
   
   Against a sophisticated
   regional foe, the United States might not want to use 
platforms at all
   but rely on a combination of stand-off attack forces, and
   information-based warfare assets (for giving targeting data 
to local
   coalition partners), coupled with special operations forces 
used for
   liaison and other tasks.
   
   Terrorism
   
   Largely because of the limited capability that classical 
military
   instruments have in coping with terrorism, conference 
participants
   kept returning to the threat that it may pose to U.S. 
national
   security. Incidents may range from the use of conventional 
explosives
   (e.g., what if the van in the World Trade Center explosion 
had been
   parked in a more vulnerable spot), to nuclear or chemical 
weapons,
   biological agents, and their analogue in cyberspace 
information
   warfare.
   
   Devices that can cause terror are getting easier to 
manufacture and
   transport and harder to detect. The equipment for 
replicating
   biological agents is inexpensive; the equipment for 
replicating
   computer agents is even cheaper. Many otherwise third-world 
Asian
   nations have very large computer-literate cohorts that make 
them
   potential information warfare powers. ...
   
   Chaos
   
   Over the next two decades, states will continue to fail. 
Some failures
   may create circumstances (e.g., refugees, malcontents, and
   environmental damage) which topple other states. To cope, 
the United
   States may need a robust capability to conduct peace and 
relief
   operations. ...
   
   A concentration on peace operations may also be a good 
reason to
   expand foreign military interactions. Improving 
interoperability with
   future coalition partners carries many advantages. Yet, 
above a
   certain technological level of integration, the risk of 
exposing
   information on U.S. capabilities to what may be temporary 
allies has
   to be carefully managed.
   
   If countering chaos were the primary mission of the U.S. 
armed forces,
   then they would have to become lighter and more mobile 
(because states
   often fail with little warning, and the United States 
usually responds
   only in extremis). The Army and Marine Corps would have 
larger roles,
   while the Navy and Air Force would focus on lift. As 
emergency
   operations become the norm, some functions assigned to 
reserve units
   may have to be shifted to active ones (e.g., to allow civil 
affairs
   assets to be used more frequently).