From: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
To: “Perry E. Metzger” <perry@piermont.com>
Message Hash: b1b7b26f78bff0c6deb398029b429462d220a1cb2b3f01f35ad0defd714a437c
Message ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.951212231006.5039C-100000@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Reply To: <199512121306.IAA02006@jekyll.piermont.com>
UTC Datetime: 1995-12-13 18:26:33 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 14 Dec 1995 02:26:33 +0800
From: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 1995 02:26:33 +0800
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Subject: Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack
In-Reply-To: <199512121306.IAA02006@jekyll.piermont.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SUN.3.91.951212231006.5039C-100000@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
On Tue, 12 Dec 1995, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>
> Go ahead and trust that no one can do it, then. Considering that NTP
> can synch up clocks over the net with astonishing accuracy with
> multiple probes, it would be hard to believe that you couldn't
Perry - I don't think NTP goes down to the sort of resolution that
appeared to be where the signal is here, and for quantisation reasons, I
don't think it can work over a public routed internetwork. I'm still open
to having my mind changed here; my network weenie gut instincts tell me
that routing is too non-random for the signal to propogate.
[I may have misread the paper, but the accuracy required seemed to be on
the order of 10-100 usecs; if I've got that wrong, could someone mail me
an OOM to be working with]
Simon
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