From: “James A. Donald” <jamesd@echeque.com>
To: nsb+limbo@nsb.fv.com>
Message Hash: d187f879baca2a034f04cb4a9004a60c13438c366d984c3970f4aaed9f0d06c2
Message ID: <199512130722.XAA11947@blob.best.net>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1995-12-13 08:48:45 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 13 Dec 1995 16:48:45 +0800
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 1995 16:48:45 +0800
To: nsb+limbo@nsb.fv.com>
Subject: Re: Usability of Cryptography (was Re: More FUD from First Virtual)
Message-ID: <199512130722.XAA11947@blob.best.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 01:06 PM 12/11/95 -0700, Bryce wrote:
> To get to the point, I want to know if this "fundamental
> tradeoff" that you refer to is in fact *fundamental*. That is
> to say: is the product of the "security factor" and the
> "usability factor" a constant? Or are there methods which can
> be practically implemented to make strong cryptography easier
> for Joe Average to use without exposing Joe to unnecessary
> risks?
Web of trust is a mess because it attempts to link keys to
physical people, which in general cannot be done.
If we stick to a lesser goal -- constancy of identity --
this is not so hard. In general it is impossible to prove that
Bryce is the "real" Bryce, but it is trivial to prove that
Bryce is the same Bryce who has a certain Web page, and the
same Bryce who posted a certain article in archives.
We should blow off this attempt to do the impossible.
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|
We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/
and our property, because of the kind |
of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald
derives from this right, not from the |
arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd@echeque.com
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