From: Bill Stewart <stewarts@ix.netcom.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Dec 95 15:35:15 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com (Cypherpunks Mailing List)
Subject: Re: NIST GAK export meeting, short version
Message-ID: <199512062336.PAA13924@ix6.ix.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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At 11:26 PM 12/5/95 -0500, Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com> wrote:
>> and on the 64-bit issue, that the government is "not certain it will
>> work." he says they "want to see it implemented and want to see
...
>This answer sounds rather silly to me. Do they seriously doubt that the
>escrow mechanism works (modulo MAB's observations about the LEAF), or expect 
>us to believe that they do ?  Clinton Brooks' comments cited later by Pat
>suggest a certain acceptance that enforcement will have its problems
>(e.g. strong crypto tunnelling), but perhaps Greiveldinger somehow doesn't
>officially share that view. Is there another interpretation of "working"
>I'm missing here ?

"Works" means a lot of things, even if you limit the discussion to official
court warrants requested with honest affidavits.  The code is supposed to 
discourage tampering, but suspects may still successfully disable GAK.
Escrow agents are supposed to deliver the correct keys successfully without
losing them (or storing them safely in the basement next to the cyclotron),
and they may not always provide 7x24 access (or may charge extra for it,
as well as charging for their lawyer's review of the warrant.)
Or the escrow agents may be multinationals that store their files off-shore.
Or the SECRET cleared escrow employee may have quit, making it more difficult
to handle classified requests.
#--
#				Thanks;  Bill
# Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts@ix.netcom.com
# Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

# Anybody notice that Microsoft's Wide Open Road ad has barbed-wire fences
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