1996-01-31 - RE: FV Demonstrates Fatal Flaw in Software Encryption of Credi tCards

Header Data

From: David Van Wie <dvw@hamachi.epr.com>
To: hua <hua@chromatic.com>
Message Hash: 0af7b7864838110b4a75695867496f2c717fca3cee0d2346fb9fa8360eff29a3
Message ID: <310E8117@hamachi>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-01-31 00:46:07 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 31 Jan 1996 08:46:07 +0800

Raw message

From: David Van Wie <dvw@hamachi.epr.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 1996 08:46:07 +0800
To: hua <hua@chromatic.com>
Subject: RE: FV Demonstrates Fatal Flaw in Software Encryption of Credi   tCards
Message-ID: <310E8117@hamachi>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



On January 30, 1996 hua[SMTP:hua@chromatic.com] wrote:

>> the credit card companies in detecting fraud and locating criminals is   
    

>> quite real.
>
>Retail clerks are not lone bandits.

My point is not that all retail clerks are bandits.  Most are   
trustworthy, but surely any long time CC user has given their card to   
someone who would rip them off if they thought they could get away with   
it.  My point is that CC #'s are not national security secrets, they are   
disclosed to potential adversaries regularly.

>> Of course, since Federal law requires the credit card companies, not   
the
>> user, to pay the costs of fraud, First Virtual's entire premise is a   
red
>> herring.  If the credit card companies are willing to take the risk,   
they
>> will (and are).
>
>Federal law does not require that a company stay in business once it
>has entered the banking market.

The point is FV's post relies on a frightening and false premise - that   
the users are exposed to one or more financial risks by FV's keyboard   
sniffer threat.

dvw





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