1996-01-26 - Re: Signing nyms’ keys (Was: Report on Portland Cpunks…)

Header Data

From: Bruce Baugh <bruceab@teleport.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 1dfddc1592620967ff205a3eb2aa81c8434cf6b8dcfa83b4c434b68f3bcaee20
Message ID: <2.2.32.19960125011259.0069b280@mail.teleport.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-01-26 21:32:11 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 05:32:11 +0800

Raw message

From: Bruce Baugh <bruceab@teleport.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 05:32:11 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Signing nyms' keys (Was: Report on Portland Cpunks...)
Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960125011259.0069b280@mail.teleport.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 01:42 PM 1/24/96 PST, janzen@idacom.hp.com wrote:

>Furthermore, by signing a nym's key you place yourself at risk.  If you
>sign the nym's key with your own key -- or sign using the key of your
>own nym, and that nym is subsequently "outed" -- then anyone wishing to
>find the individual(s) behind any nym whose key you've signed can
>attempt to coerce you into revealing this information, since you have
>claimed to know it.

This is the real problem, one which doesn't (to me) have a ready solution.
If others can demonstrate that there [is|is not] some fairly straightforward
way around it, I'd be happy to read it.

Bruce Baugh
bruceab@teleport.com
http://www.teleport.com/~bruceab






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