1996-01-20 - Re: Hack Lotus?

Header Data

From: “Peter Trei” <trei@process.com>
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 2dd1644e82885cb97a1f21c164d8213e5703b9017c511b9639a825bf7c494e85
Message ID: <9601200158.AA07776@toad.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-01-20 02:28:21 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 20 Jan 1996 10:28:21 +0800

Raw message

From: "Peter Trei" <trei@process.com>
Date: Sat, 20 Jan 1996 10:28:21 +0800
To: <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Hack Lotus?
Message-ID: <9601200158.AA07776@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Phill writes:
> 
> I've been thinking about how I would do the lotus hack. I certainly would not be 
> wanting to do a public key operation for the benefit of the government on every 
> message. How about the following:
> 
> During installation of program: 
> Select a random key ER, encrypt it under the govt. public key to give Eg(ER). 
> To start encrypting,
> 
> chose a random value R, encrypt under destination public key to give Ek(R)
 
> set 40 bits of R to 0 to produce R' 
> Encrypt R' under ER to give E-ER(R')
> Hash R, E-ER(R') and Eg(ER) with a one way function (MDMF like) to produce the 
> actual key. 
> Send across Ek(R), E-ER(R'), Eg(ER) 
> To decrypt the message one needs the information for the escrow authority.
> 
> 		Phill

Wouldn't this interoperate only with other systems which had a similar setup? I suspect
the Lotus wants the US-Domestic and the International versions to interoperate
transparently, including with  their older versions.

Kaufman describes the encryption setup of Notes in moderate detail on pages 448-454
of 'Network Security'. It's a typical mixed system, with a secret key encrypted under the
recipient's Public key (a short one or a long one, depending on the local of the 
recipient and/or sender).

I suspect that Lotus has not completely reworked it's security system for the 
international version, and that they are in fact doing a second public key operation on 
the 3 bytes of GAK'd data.

If they're nasty, they'll check on the receiving side as well, to ensure that the LEAF 
and/or the espionage-enabling key have not been patched in the sending 'International'
version.

Peter Trei
trei@process.com


Peter Trei
Senior Software Engineer
Purveyor Development Team                                
Process Software Corporation
http://www.process.com
trei@process.com





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