From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 9441f57f1f7009ed4a3d074fc5cf26e9f969ed93c1c51d34511cf9cc7294f88e
Message ID: <v02120d08ad107b4e9236@[192.0.2.1]>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-01-03 21:17:56 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 05:17:56 +0800
From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 1996 05:17:56 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis
Message-ID: <v02120d08ad107b4e9236@[192.0.2.1]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 7:02 1/3/96, Fred Cohen wrote:
>You seem to be missing an important point about foiling traffic
>analysis. It is essentially the same problem as the covert channel
>problem and its solution has the same challenges - it consumes a great
>in the way of resources. In order to eliminate traffic analysis, you
>essentially have to always use the full bandwidth available (although
>you can have pseudo-random burst behaviors). This in turn means that
>instead of gaining the low cost resulting from sharing bandwidth, you
>end up having far more utilization and (depending on what portion of the
>world does this) increasing the price of the resource. So it costs a
>lot more and uses a great deal of bandwidth.
You are correct. A network of encrypted links that allways move packets at
full bandwidth is the basis of Wei Dai's Pipenet. If anyone ever codes
this, I am willing to sponsor a node. Other nodes may be set up if some
payment mechanism using Ecash is integrated with the system.
-- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com>
PGP encrypted mail preferred.
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1996-01-03 (Thu, 4 Jan 1996 05:17:56 +0800) - Re: Foiling Traffic Analysis - shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green)