From: Simon Spero <ses@tipper.oit.unc.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 05:52:55 +0800
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Subject: Re: Remailer passphrases
In-Reply-To: <199603121951.OAA02237@jekyll.piermont.com>
Message-ID: <Pine.SOL.3.91.960312140002.390D-100000@chivalry>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Tue, 12 Mar 1996, Perry E. Metzger wrote:

> 
> Signed Diffie-Hellman key exchanges have the property known as
> "Perfect Forward Secrecy". Even if the opponent gets your public keys


Just to clarify Perry's statement- Diffie-Helman key exchanges can 
provide Perfect forward secrecy if fresh parameters are used each time- 
protocols like the old version of SKIP, which do not use fresh paramaters 
each time, do not provide perfect forward secrecy.

Simon

---
They say in  online country             So which side are you on boys
There is no middle way                  Which side are you on
You'll either be a Usenet man           Which side are you on boys
Or a thug for the CDA                   Which side are you on?
  National Union of Computer Operatives; Hackers, local 37   APL-CPIO