1996-03-30 - Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?

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From: JonWienke@aol.com
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 5680988fcc91e4edce2109e6ac522eb67cb3a56c91c4162e17c600d085080548
Message ID: <960330120159181484785@emout09.mail.aol.com>
Reply To: _N/A

UTC Datetime: 1996-03-30 21:14:01 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 31 Mar 1996 05:14:01 +0800

Raw message

From: JonWienke@aol.com
Date: Sun, 31 Mar 1996 05:14:01 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
Message-ID: <960330120159_181484785@emout09.mail.aol.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


To Jim Bell and "Black Unicorn":

I have been following your debate with interest, and would like to re-iterate
some points that were made and add some of my own.

The concept of encrypting a key before escrowing it is excellent.  It
prevents the escrow agent from misusing the key, and protects the principal
from government snooping.  If the escrow agent is served a subpoena, he can
say, "Here is the key you want. Go ahead and take it.  In fact, here is my
entire key database.  All keys are encrypted by the principals before I get
them, so I can't guarantee that you will be able to use them, but here they
are anyway."  At this point, the LEO's can take whatever they want, but the
principals are still safe.  The escrow agent doesn't have to send any
encrypted "rosebud" message to anyone, and he can bend over backwards to make
the LEO's happy, so his butt is covered, too.  At this point, the LEO's can
either (a) send the keys to the NSA for decryption, and thereby admit that
the gov't can break IDEA (or whatever cryptosystem was used to encrypt the
keys before the escrow agent got them), (b) rubber hose the unencrypted
key(s) from the principal, or (c) go home and pout.

Of course, if you never escrow your keys, you can avoid the whole scenario
altogether, leaving the gov't with options (b) and (c).

Jonathan Wienke





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