1996-03-22 - Re: Kid Gloves or Megaphones

Header Data

From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green)
To: “E. ALLEN SMITH” <stewarts@ix.netcom.com
Message Hash: 6601f1c6f4c384a5036424b7650cbc90278700bec30f8d3f5c6d3b09c6f21a55
Message ID: <v02120d00ad77bf00673f@[192.0.2.1]>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-03-22 06:53:31 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 22 Mar 1996 14:53:31 +0800

Raw message

From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 1996 14:53:31 +0800
To: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <stewarts@ix.netcom.com
Subject: Re:  Kid Gloves or Megaphones
Message-ID: <v02120d00ad77bf00673f@[192.0.2.1]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 19:26 3/21/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote:
>From:   IN%"stewarts@ix.netcom.com"  "Bill Stewart" 16-MAR-1996 01:55:32.07
>
>>Depending on the details of Ian's method, I don't think the debate
>>needs to be taken to the public, or even done - it may simply be a
>>done deal once the technology's out there.  If Mark Twain Bank or
>>Merita Bank or the Federal <Exonive-Deleted> Reserve wants to offer
>Digicash(tm) with Payee-Non-Anonymity, they can always make it a contractual
>>requirement that their payees not use anonymity techniques in return for
>>being paid.
>
>        Wouldn't the viability of such a clause depend on the anonymizing
>scheme in question? If the bank's cooperation isn't needed (i.e., going through
>a proxy), then such a limit would be empty.

It is true that the issuer is unable to discover that double blinding is
being used. The real problem with the protocol is that it requires
payor/payee collusion, which may make it difficult to execute.


-- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com>
   PGP encrypted mail preferred.







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