From: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 1996 21:58:23 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: NYT on Crypto Issue
Message-ID: <199603251143.GAA14247@pipe1.nyc.pipeline.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


   The New York Times, March 25, 1996, p. D5.


   The key issue for the Net is not smut, it is the use of
   encryption

      Growing fears that Big Brother might decide to read your
      E-mail.

   By Denise Caruso


   The current uproar over the Internet is about smut and what
   can be made public on the global computer network. But the
   next public-policy tangle will be about what we're allowed
   to keep secret.

   Earlier this month, a bipartisan group from both houses of
   Congress introduced versions of legislation called the
   Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1996. This bill,
   which outlines the proper use of encryption technologies
   for privacy and security, is by far the most critical piece
   of Internet legislation yet introduced.

   Encryption uses a mathematical key to scramble and
   unscramble digital messages so they can be read only by
   their intended recipients and not by human or electronic
   snoopers. Legislation about this powerful technology is
   especially important when viewed in light of two laws
   already on the books.

   One of these, the Digital Telephony Act, signed into law in
   1994, allows Federal law-enforcement agencies to update the
   telephone network with the most pervasive surveillance
   equipment in history.

   The other, the freshly signed Communications Decency Act,
   bans "indecent" material from the Internet. It is a law
   that many legislators seemed to feel was on shaky ground
   even as Congress was passing it. A constitutional challenge
   to the law is currently being heard in Federal District
   Court in Philadelphia.

   Though the encryption bill as written is receiving
   qualified support from industry and civil libertarians,
   some worry that changes made in committee could make the
   bill too restrictive, completing a triumvirate of Big
   Brother legislation that would give law enforcement the
   ability and rationale to monitor all the electronic
   messages of citizens, leaving little or no recourse for
   private or secure communication.

   Such restrictions threaten to suffocate the Internet. As
   new users and businesses flock daily to the Internet, their
   need to protect confidential business data and messages
   becomes a key issue in making the Net safe enough to be
   useful. Computer security experts say that many of today's
   problems on the Net -- minors getting access to
   pornography, security breaches of corporate data, the need
   to prove one's identity -- could be solved by using
   encryption.

   Today, using encryption of any kind is still perfectly
   legal inside the United States. Historically, it was mostly
   used to protect secret military communications, so the
   technology is still classified as munitions -- the same
   threat to national security as a boatload of artillery
   shells. Thus any products containing encryption are subject
   to strict export controls.

   Law-enforcement and national security officials say that
   widespread use of strong encryption would enable terrorists
   and organized-crime syndicates to communicate with
   impunity. They say export control is the only way to keep
   this genie in its bottle, at least when it comes to
   foreign, not domestic crime.

   In addition, security experts have persuaded the Clinton
   Administration to propose an encryption method called "key
   escrow" that would give the Government access to
   information even after it had been encrypted. Key-escrow
   systems generate a decrypting key that is held by a trusted
   third party. When law-enforcement agents show up with a
   court warrant, the trustee hands over the key to unlock the
   message.

   So far, the Clinton Administration's proposals, which
   include a key-escrow system called Clipper have been
   universally reviled by both civil libertarians and the
   computer industry, which claims it stands to be deprived of
   up to $60 billion annually by the year 2000 because of
   export controls. They argue that any country today can make
   and sell encryption products stronger than what can be
   legally exported from the United States and that people
   won't use a system like key escrow because it has a
   built-in security compromise.

   One defender of key-escrow policy is Dorothy Denning, a
   professor of computer science at Georgetown University and
   a consultant to the military industry. She argued in a
   letter to Senator Patrick J. Leahy Democrat of Vermont --
   one of the sponsors of the new legislation -- that such a
   system was vital to public safety and security.

   James Barksdale, president of the Netscape Communications
   Corporation, whose popular Web-browser software has
   built-in encryption capabilities, called Ms. Denning's
   solution a "stopgap measure."

   "Key escrow is an unworkable idea, and we do not support
   it," Mr. Barksdale said. "Key escrow will be defeated just
   like Prohibition was defeated by bathtub gin -- all it took
   was a big bag of sugar and a long weekend."

   Policy watchdogs like the Center for Democracy and
   Technology and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, both
   outspoken advocates for privacy rights and due process,
   agree that the bill is headed in the right direction. It
   does not dictate the use of a key escrow system, eases
   export controls for "mass market" products (like
   Netscape's), prohibits any restriction on the domestic use
   or sale of encryption, and provides a "personal use" policy
   for American travelers who use encryption while outside the
   country.

   But the bill is sure to face a fight as it moves through
   the House and the Senate, and the key-escrow and
   export-control proponents marshal their experts.

   David Farber, a professor of computer science at the
   University of Pennsylvania and a board member of the
   Electronic Frontier Foundation, says encryption policy
   always turns into "a religious discussion" between those
   who fear terrorism and those who want to live without fear
   of constant surveillance.

   But, he adds, if you take privacy discussions to the
   people, their attitudes are pretty clear. " If you ask the
   American public what they think of national I.D. cards, for
   example, a huge percentage are opposed to them," he said.
   "Why? They're not hiding anything. They just don't want the
   Government to have that type of power."

   [End]