1996-03-09 - Re: V-chips, CC, and Motorcycle Helmets

Header Data

From: “E. ALLEN SMITH” <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
To: jimbell@pacifier.com
Message Hash: a8b5ef462f06508c40abd7b809d1db606272c4b3b942b5fd9edd82ba3c4f308f
Message ID: <01I23QL2OC22AKTTTI@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-03-09 15:00:43 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 9 Mar 1996 23:00:43 +0800

Raw message

From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
Date: Sat, 9 Mar 1996 23:00:43 +0800
To: jimbell@pacifier.com
Subject: Re: V-chips, CC, and Motorcycle Helmets
Message-ID: <01I23QL2OC22AKTTTI@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	IN%"jimbell@pacifier.com"  "jim bell" 14-FEB-1996 05:12:52.66
>At 07:36 PM 2/13/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote:
>>At  8:15 PM 2/13/96 -0500, Declan B. McCullagh wrote:

>Actually, I think the primary targets will be either the middle level 
>manager types, or the ones who have attracted a substantial amount of bad 
>publicity by "following orders."  Lon Horiuchi (the sniper who shot Vicki 
>Weaver) for example, would be a excellent example of a person who'd try to 
>claim, "I was just following orders."  Okay, maybe he was, but so was Adolph 
>Eichmann.  

>Once the tax collectors/enforcers were targeted, the rest of the government 
>wouldn't be able to operate, and would collapse.

	One difficulty in this is that the middle managers - the most vital
ones in the long run - are also the ones that can best protect themselves using
the net and various cypherpunks techniques - partial (not to their superiors)
anonymnity with persistent, verifiable pseudonyms. If they don't directly
deal with the public, they're kind of hard to target.

>>If, after a couple of the Waco people had been hit, I was given the
>>responsibility to protect them I would proceed as follews:
>>
>>(1) Gather them and their families onto some Army base and step up the
>>patrols.  Now I have them safe.

>And, of course, you've just ruined their lives.  Think about it.  By doing 
>this, it is made absolutely, completely, and abundantly clear to them that 
>THEY are considered "the enemy" and that their lives are forever put at 
>risk.   Previously, government employees could hold their heads up high and 
>be proud of their "public service."  Now, if they're discovered, they have 
>to disappear.  Does this treatment sound familiar?  Their job description 
>and circumstances will more closely resemble that of a Mafia enforcer than a 
>proud public servant.  They'll have to teach their children to lie about 
>what their parent does, rather than risk getting exposed.

	You have an interesting point about motivations and the likely
psychological effects. Given the headaches that counterintelligence goes
through in wars - nobody wants to shut up - such secrecy would be difficult.

>Who, exactly, would want to work for the government under such 
>circumstances?  Remember, we're not just talking about a tiny fraction of 
>their number; if the most egregious ones were hidden the ones that were less 
>secure would be killed in their place.

	Would they? You appear to be assuming that with less targets available,
people will start being less selective. You may be correct.

>>(3) Make sure that the names/faces of the cannon fodder in future actions
>>are not available to make it harder to target the guilty.

>Then they'll target the "names," the ones who show their faces.  See how this 
>works?  If the only way  you can maintain the government is to keep them all 
>absolutely anonymous, then that government has FAILED.

	Has it? Currently, we've got the guys who deal with the public (the
politicians and the low-level bureaucrats) and the faceless drones (the rest
of the bureaucrats). The politicians can be protected, and already are to some
degree. The low-level bureaucrats aren't _that_ likely to be targeted by enough
people to make a difference, and the ones who go bad enough to do so can be
protected (or sacrificed, if that seems to be the way to keep the public
happy). The faceless drones can be even more faceless, and so very hard to
target.

>Furthermore, this system's anonymity allows disgruntled public employees the 
>chance to collect money by "turning in" their bosses to the public's ire; if 
>the personnel list for the government is nominally a secret, it will "leak" 
>eventually and those on the list will be followed, confirmed, and targeted.

	That's an interesting point. I can see some sort of Blacknet-variety
system developing to distribute information and get paid for it, even if the
employee in question doesn't want to do the hit themselves, although the
payment part could be a problem. Even with the partial anonymnity protections
I mention above, _somebody_ will know who the person who ordered another Ruby
Ridge is - I doubt a government could operate with full internal anonymnity.
	-Allen





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