From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
Date: Tue, 23 Apr 1996 21:20:29 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FBI Bulletin: Social Protests in the 1990s: Planning a Response
Message-ID: <01I3V17SNRYW8Y4Z9L@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	An interesting look at FBI psychology for some things. Looks like the
pro-lifers are getting a bit more sensible... pity from my viewpoint, but good
as an example.
	-Allen

From:	IN%"rre@weber.ucsd.edu" 22-APR-1996 07:46:41.16
From: Phil Agre <pagre@weber.ucsd.edu>

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Date: Sat, 20 Apr 1996 12:57:28 -0400
From: Matthew Gaylor <freematt@coil.com>
Subject: FBI Bulletin: Social Protests in the 1990s: Planning a Response

Social Protests in the 1990s: Planning a Response

By Gary A. Allgeyer, M.S.
Captain Allgeyer serves with the Melbourne, Florida, Police
Department.

>From the January 1996 Issue of The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin

"The Law Enforcement Bulletin is published monthly by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Ninth and Pennsylvania Ave, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20535. Contributors' opinions and statements
should not be considered as an endorsement for any policy, program, or
service by the FBI."




During the 1990s, many communities have witnessed a resurgence in
protests and civil disobedience demonstrations reminiscent of the
civil rights and antiwar movements of earlier decades. Major
issues today include abortion, nuclear proliferation,
environmental protection, service and access rights of the
physically challenged, and continued civil rights concerns. Any
community with product- or service-oriented businesses or
military installations may be targeted for action, either by
local activists or national organizations.

The City of Melbourne, located on the southeast central coast of
Florida, has been the focus of such actions in recent years,
primarily due to the presence of the only   abortion clinic in a
county with almost one-half million residents. In addition, the
clinic's highly outspoken owner makes her home in Melbourne, as
does the leader of Operation Rescue, a national pro-life
organization. These factors have made the city a hotbed for the
abortion issue.

The intensity of pro-life and pro-choice sentiments and the
multitude of proponents on either side required the Melbourne
Police Department (MPD) to meet this challenge head on. Yet,
despite hundreds of arrests, lengthy trials, lawsuits, and
attempts by both sides of the issue to challenge the department's
neutrality and professionalism, the MPD continued to maintain a
positive public image, as demonstrated in television coverage,
press reports, and editorials.

The department has learned a great deal since its first encounter
with activism several years ago. Agency administrators have
identified and established methods to address several issues
common to the protests they faced. In many ways, these issues
represent features typical to most contemporary activist
movements, regardless of where they operate or what causes they
support.

NEW CRUSADERS

For the most part, the general public's perception of social
protests has focused on the fringe--a picture of activists as a
few misguided malcontents driven by extreme viewpoints. Images of
barefooted flower children dressed in tie-dyed shirts and old
jeans usually come to mind.

Protesters today are more likely to arrive at the scene
conservatively dressed, some even wearing designer clothes. They
are committed to a cause, but operate from what would appear to
be a less radical position. Whereas the old school proclaimed to
Middle America, "We're different," the activists of the 1990s
claim, "We are Middle America."

Activism, once the domain of extremists, now is viewed as a valid
form of creating social change. Christian activists, in
particular, come from conservative backgrounds and depend on the
belief that most Americans share their   basic values to build
their ranks and project an image of legitimacy onto their
activities. Protesters who once would have been considered
reactionary now may be seen as courageous proponents of a cause.
This change in public perception creates some particular
challenges for law enforcement.

CHALLENGES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT

Intelligence Gathering:

Florida law allows law enforcement to collect and maintain
intelligence on persons and groups if the surveillance is
conducted with "a reasonable, good faith belief that it will lead
to detection of ongoing or reasonably anticipated criminal
activities"1 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, incidents of past
abuse create a negative public perception of police efforts to
gather intelligence information on activist groups.
Nevertheless, the necessity for intelligence gathering cannot be
over emphasized. To cope successfully with a major incident or a
series of announced protests, the police must collect information
about the leaders and members of the sponsoring group(s). The
Melbourne Police Department assigned a full-time de-tective to
intelligence duties with the advent of large-scale abortion
protests. The detective and the department met the challenge of
intelligence gathering in a very direct way.

Every issue has two sides, and law enforcement can use this fact
to its advantage with regard to activist groups. For the MPD,
much of the intelligence information gained on pro-life
organizers came from their opposition. Private investigators
contracted by pro-choice groups tracked, photographed, and
collected data on pro-life activists,   and then offered much of
this in-telligence information to the police department.
By accepting this information, the department could have opened
itself to criticism from the pro-life side. But such protests
have not materialized, largely because pro-life organizations
have their own intelligence groups in operation, gathering
similar data on clinic employees, doctors, and patients.
The police department uses this intelligence information to plan
its response to demonstrations and other protest activities. Much
of the success of this effort can be attributed to the approach
taken by the MPD investigator.

During the first critical months of the intelligence-gathering
initiative, the MPD investigator remained open and approachable
to both sides. After introducing himself to pro-life leaders, he
began to attend their groups' public meetings. Although he
remained steadfastly neutral on the issue of abortion, pro-life
organizers accepted the detective in his official role.
Some of the Christian activists even saw his personal conversion
to the cause as a special challenge. While he may have gained
little critical information from these contacts, the personal
interaction enabled him to provide the department's command staff
with his intuitive assessment of the pro-life leadership. His
close involvement with the groups also minimized the effect of an
anticipated disinformation campaign against the police department
as the protests and demonstrations grew.

In contrast, efforts to infiltrate pro-life groups with
undercover officers produced little benefit. Because of the
successful application of racketeering statutes to their
organizations, pro-life leaders avoided discussing any
law-breaking activity in rallies or other public forums.
Therefore, it became difficult for the police department to
anticipate the number and identities of participants in trespass
and civil disobedience incidents prior to the actual events.
Police staffing for the events became a combination of "best
guess" deci-sionmaking and trial and error.

Staffing and Financial Concerns:

Protests and mass-arrest situations are labor-intensive events
that often require more staff than departments can schedule for
regular duty. Thus, staffing becomes a financial challenge for
any agency faced with such events.

In 1993, the MPD spent $51,000 in overtime for peacekeeping and
enforcement duties. Most communities accept such costs as a
natural consequence of the rights of citizens to engage in
peaceful protests. However, in the abortion-rights battle, public
funds can become a propaganda tool for both sides.

Pro-choice leaders decry the need to devote tax dollars to
protect abortion clinics. They attempt to influence public
opinion by claiming that if not for the antiabortion activity,
police could be out fighting crime. Pro-life leaders attack local
governments, questioning why they spend public funds to protect
clinics that perform abortions.

For law enforcement, the obvious need for overtime staffing does
not justify a carte blanche approach to personnel allocation.
Indeed, agencies should plan their staffing levels carefully.
Overstaffing can be interpreted as overreaction and can erode
public and political support for the police as expenses build. At
the same time, understaffing delays an appropriate response to a
fast-breaking event, opening an agency to accusations of
favoritism and lack of preparation.

The MPD approach uses past experience, current intelligence data,
and consensus building  among the command staff to determine the
department's response on a daily basis. Contingency plans, such
as callout lists and mutual-aid requests, complement the daily
plan and allow for a quick escalation of personnel levels as the
need arises.

Use of Force:

During a demonstration, the   arrest procedures and defensive
tactics employed by police become high-visibility--and
potentially high-liability--issues. The public perceives how well
an agency responds to incidents based on the level and type of
force used in restraining, moving, and arresting nonviolent
protesters.

Antiabortion protesters usually employ passive resistance
techniques when engaged in trespass activities and civil
disobedience. Department administrators decided that officers
should not use take- downs, come-alongs, and pressure point
control techniques in response to the protestors' passive
resistance.

After reviewing news videos, newspaper photographs, and media
accounts, the command staff concluded that these techniques
produced fewer benefits than their associated costs--images of
over-reaction and the appearance of unnecessary cruelty. Thus,
training becomes a focal point for any agency tasked with
responding to such incidents.

Training:

Recognizing the hazards of overreaction, the MPD command staff
developed a thorough training plan, and from the outset,
communicated to officers both the policy and philosophy of the
department's response strategy. Instructors briefed officers on
the respective beliefs and positions of both sides of the
abortion issue and juxtaposed this information with the MPD's
operational plan:

The morality of allowing (abortion) is unquestionably the most
passionate issue of today, and undoubtedly, the personnel of the
Melbourne Police Department hold as varied a collection of
outlooks on the matter as does the general public.
However, our code of ethics requires that we never act
officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, animosities
or friendships to influence our decisions and that we will
enforce the law courteously and appropriately, without fear of
aggression.

Professionally, then, we cannot and will not, collectively or
individually, take sides on the issue of whether abortion is
moral or immoral. It is therefore our intention to safeguard the
rights of holders of both convictions to the best of our ability,
by enforcing the law firmly but compassionately, while respecting
the constitutional rights of all persons.2

This foundation set the tone for more specific training in
perimeter security, crowd control, arrest techniques, and booking
procedures. Advised that both sides of the issue often try to
provoke personal responses from police personnel on the scene,
officers were briefed on deflection responses and the importance
of maintaining neutrality. Instruction also included handling
press inquiries, complaints from neighbors adjacent to the
clinic, and comments from passing motorists.

Training also focused on methods of response to a frequent tactic
used by pro-life groups--individuals' and groups' chaining or
locking themselves to doors, fences, and one another to impede
entry into abortion clinics. In these attempts, the protestors
generally use steel bicycle locks or heavy chains. Therefore,
when responding to pro-life demonstrations, the MPD always comes
prepared with a variety of cutting tools, protective shields, and
specially trained personnel.

The emphasis of the department's philosophy and the depth of
officer training paid off when the level of protests increased in
the spring of 1993. An injunction granted in April 1993,
restricting activities within a buffer zone around the abortion
clinic, led to over 140 arrests in the ensuing weeks. During that
time, no arrestees were injured, although one officer received a
back injury while attempting to catch a protestor who suddenly
had gone limp.

Logistics:

Preparation for events likely to result in mass arrests entails
tre-mendous effort. The wide range of potential scenarios forces
agencies to prepare numerous contingencies. In other words, they
must have a plan for personnel and equipment to respond to a
small protest that could easily either expand or fizzle.
Implementing a response plan involves considerable risk,
especially in financial terms. The MPD spent over $7,000 during
the first week of scheduled protests in spring 1993, but made no
arrests. As the protests grew, the need for more flexibility in
response became clear.

The MPD command staff brainstormed the logistical process by
asking a number of questions. What resources are necessary for
the arrest function? How many arrests should be expected? What
are the best- and worst-case arrest scenarios? How many officers
are needed per arrestee? How long should the booking process
take? What special equipment should be on hand--or quickly
available--each day? The command staff compiled the answers to
these questions into an operational plan for the continuing
protests.

The plan outlined job descriptions for all personnel. Many jobs
were combined for small events, but remained separate in the plan
to allow for easy expansion. The plan identified eight command
and logistical positions: Incident commander, field force
commander, tactical commander, arrest processing supervisor,
logistics officer, traffic and security supervisor, supply
officer, and tactical supervisor.

The command staff also compiled a list of equipment that might be
needed during large demonstrations. These items were gathered for
quick issue to officers. Flowcharts and checklists provided
incident commanders with an easy method   to evaluate and control
the police response.

Interagency Coordination:

The police department supplemented its efforts by coordinating
mutual aid with other local and State agencies. An interagency
agreement for mutual aid in emergencies had long been in place.
In addition, the MPD made arrangements with agencies to provide
personnel in the event of a major disturbance. To date, the
police department has not found it necessary to invoke the
agreement.

However, as arrests mounted in the spring of 1993 and beyond,
police coordination with the Brevard County Detention Center
(BCDC) assumed particular importance. Operated by the Brevard
County Sheriff, the BCDC holds over 800 prisoners serving county
jail terms or awaiting trial, sentencing, or transfer to other
institutions. A large-scale protest easily can produce arrest
numbers that equal 10 to 20 percent of the current jail
population.

Many of the tactics employed by activists--such as refusing to
identify themselves upon arrest--are designed specifically to
land them in jail and thus heighten the impact of their protests.
To reduce booking time at the jail, the police de-partment's
command staff developed an on-scene arrest procedure. Police
personnel photographed arrestees (full face, with no hats or
sunglasses) with the arresting officer. Officers then restrained
the arrestees using flex-cuffs marked with indelible ink. This
procedure simplified the paperwork process once the officers had
positively identified the arrestees.

Department administrators also conducted advanced planning with
the county prosecutor's office. With input from police
administrators, the prosecutor's office predetermined appropriate
charges for given actions and prepared sample narratives for
officers that include all elements of each separate offense. For
major events, an assistant State's attorney provides on-scene
legal advice to the incident commander.

Because pro-life groups often allow, and even encourage, children
to engage in protest activities, the police department also
included the Youth Services Division of the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services in the planning process. During
demonstrations, this agency assumes responsibility for
safeguarding children who are in custody due to a parent's
arrest. Policymakers decided to take all juvenile violators into
custody, but to file criminal charges only against those 16 or
older. Younger children are transported from the scene and held
until their parents come to get them.

PLANNING FOR PROTESTS:

Communities of all sizes face the potential for demonstrations
and acts of social protest. Even when peaceful, these events
challenge the resources of local law enforcement agencies.
Because demonstrations can escalate quickly into more menacing
assaults against public order, agencies must prepare for a full
range of response options. Agency administrators should use
specific planning methods to determine appropriate responses. In
the face of potential protests and demonstrations, agencies need
to scan, plan, train, respond, and evaluate.

Scan:

Police administrators should scan the environment. Does the
community have protest potential? Are there abortion or family
planning  facilities, nuclear plants, military bases, or defense
contractors in the area? Is economic disparity an issue? Are
there civil rights concerns or racial unrest? What types of
protests have occurred locally and regionally?

Plan:

The size and type of potential protests should dictate the
response. Police administrators should contact their counterparts
in jurisdictions already affected by protests. Law enforcement
agencies must coordinate their planning with related agencies and
offices.

Local law enforcement agencies must predetermine task planning,
personnel allocation, and deployment plans. Adequate supervision
of the field force and booking facilities is essential. Police
administrators also should arrange contingency funding through
the local government if current funds appear insufficient.

Train:

Effective training cannot occur on the day of the event;
personnel must be trained in advance. Agencies should review and
address use-of-force issues related to nonviolent or passive
resistance. Officers should train in arrest, transportation, and
confinement techniques. Administrators should use training
sessions to assess employee readiness, both on emotional and
physical scales.

Respond:

When an event occurs, the established reaction plan should be
implemented in increments, according to need. This measured
reaction will enable the police department to escalate or scale
down its response in a more controlled way.

Incident commanders should scan for new tactics, attitudes, and
actions of all participants. Supervisors should monitor personnel
closely for compliance with established policies. When responding
to volatile situations, officers must avoid the temptation to
become overinvolved or to allow emotion to overtake reason.

Evaluate:

Agencies should conduct after-action debriefings and report their
findings in detailed postincident reports. The reports should
answer basic questions about the police response. Was the plan
effective? If not, why not? How do command officers, supervisors,
and line officers feel about their performances? What needs to be
changed?

The evaluation stage also includes the tabulation of costs.
Agencies should count on various groups--including the press,
politicians, local government administrators, and even the
protesters themselves--to ask how much the police response cost
taxpayers. Of course, each of these groups has different needs
and motives for acquiring this information. No matter how
well-executed its response, the police department should expect
criticism to come from one or more camps.

PREPARING FOR THE NEXT EVENT:

After completing these stages, the agency faces additional tasks.
Scanning, planning, and training for the next potential incident
must begin anew. Unexpected questions should be answered, and old
ones revisited.

Administrators must remember that despite the nonviolent focus of
most social protesters, fringe elements still exist that use
firearms, bombs, and chemical agents to accomplish their goals.
All aspects of the planning process should incorporate a response
strategy for such contingencies.

CONCLUSION:

Social protest--sometimes honorable, sometimes inglorious--has a
long history in the United States. The role of law enforcement is
not to impede legitimate acts of social demonstration but to
enforce court-mandated restrictions and to ensure individual and
community safety. By following a methodical plan and anticipating
problems before they occur, law enforcement can meet the
challenges of contemporary protests successfully.

Endnotes:
1 FLA. STAT. 119.011, d. 2.
2 Melbourne, Florida, Police Department Abortion Protest
Operational Plan, January 1993, 1.