1996-05-23 - Re: The Crisis with Remailers

Header Data

From: “E. ALLEN SMITH” <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 0a9331b345caa33710b69df99839b39ae2febf97966ca4d936b6fcab62de041b
Message ID: <01I50NKMAX5W8Y4X9G@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-05-23 05:05:19 UTC
Raw Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 13:05:19 +0800

Raw message

From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 13:05:19 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Crisis with Remailers
Message-ID: <01I50NKMAX5W8Y4X9G@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


	I just realized that I haven't been making something clear. The
ephemeral endpoints (to use Lance Cottrell's phrase) will be identified when
they're used. The purpose of concealing from all but a trusted group (remailer
operators) their address (at first) is to slow that identification as much
as possible. If it takes someone (NSA or whatever) repeatedly sending messages
through to discover each new address, this will take longer (and make it harder
for traffic analysis, especially by other parties) than if the output end's
address were immediately made public knowledge. This can be helped by the
remailer(s) sending to the output address only accepting such mail from another
remailer.
	-Allen





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