From: "David F. Ogren" <ogren@cris.com>
Date: Fri, 31 May 1996 20:40:44 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: [crypto] crypto-protocols for trading card games
Message-ID: <199605310727.DAA21133@darius.cris.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


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In my earlier message I said:

> > Cards are not transferrable.  In order to make cards transferrable
> > the game company must be able to invalidate cards which have been
> > traded to others.  In other words if Alice wants to give a cards
> > to Bob she must:

<snip>

Gary Howland said:
> This is the double spending problem.
>  

Me again:
> > Since step 3 is so costly to implement, I think it is unlikely
> > that a cryptography-based trading card game will have tradable
> > cards.
> 

Mr. Howland again:
> Given that untraceability of cards is less of an issue than with
> e-cash, why not have a central registry of the owners of the cards
> (which would consist of the card hashes paired with the public key
> fingerprint)?  Admittedly this means the players must be on line,
> but then we all know how difficult off line detection of double
> spenders is.
> 

And herein lies the problem with an implementation of trading card
games.  In order to detect "double spenders", the system must be
on-line.  However, I believe going on-line will drive the costs of
running such a game out of the range of commercial feasibility.

First of all, it requires that all players have Internet access.  This
reduces marketability.

Secondly, it requires that both players make an Internet connection
with the game company everytime they want to play a game.  This will
incur costs to the game company that it invariably will want to pass
on to the players.  Players, however, will be very resistant to a game
that requires a subscription fee as well as costs for purchasing
"cards".  Especially, if becomes known that the only reason for the
game requiring on-line access is to prevent "cheaters".  It also
raises the question of whether the game program could be "hacked" to
avoid checking for authenticity of cards.

I think that a more realistic solution to the "double spending" 
problem is to not allow the transfer of cards between players.

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--
David F. Ogren
ogren@concentric.net (alternate address: dfogren@msn.com)
PGP Key ID: 0xC626E311
PGP Key Fingerprint: 24 23 CD 15 BF 8D D1 DE  81 71 84 C8 2C E0 4B 01
(public key available via server or by sending a message to
ogren@concentric.net with a subject of GETPGPKEY)