From: jamesd@echeque.com
To: “E. ALLEN SMITH” <shamrock@netcom.com
Message Hash: 1be35bfe189d019949b0b8fdd79f698f43cfa4acef8961768adc859dfb304b70
Message ID: <199605051818.LAA13740@dns2.noc.best.net>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-05-05 22:25:02 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 6 May 1996 06:25:02 +0800
From: jamesd@echeque.com
Date: Mon, 6 May 1996 06:25:02 +0800
To: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <shamrock@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Kid Gloves or Megaphones
Message-ID: <199605051818.LAA13740@dns2.noc.best.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>>It is true that the issuer is unable to discover that double blinding is
>>being used. The real problem with the protocol is that it requires
>>payor/payee collusion, which may make it difficult to execute.
At 07:58 PM 5/4/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote:
> Can the payee discover that the payor isn't colluding before the bank
>can figure out who the payee is?
If the payor is not colluding, then the payee will immediately discover
he has not been paid, because the checksums are wrong, and his software
says "bad payment"
If the payor is colluding, then no matter what he reveals to the bank,
the bank cannot discover the payee. Note that with payee anonymity,
the payee does not have to promptly check in his money, so the bank
has no hope of narrowing the search by coincidence in time.
But if the payee is colluding, then the payor can be detected by
coincidence in time.
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We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/
and our property, because of the kind |
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derives from this right, not from the |
arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd@echeque.com
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