From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
Date: Mon, 27 May 1996 06:48:27 +0800
To: llurch@networking.stanford.edu
Subject: Re: Children's Privacy Act
Message-ID: <01I54Q46PC5C8Y4ZHR@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	IN%"llurch@networking.stanford.edu"  "Rich Graves" 25-MAY-1996 02:09:28.75

>I'm sure you know the law and practice better, but my insurance seems to
>have a "preexisting conditions" clause. Knowingly doing the above
>constitutes fraud. (Of course lots of people probably get away with it.)

	And how's the insurance company going to know that something is a
preexisting condition when they can't keep records of it? Moreover, partially
due to state laws, most preexisting condition exemptions have limits on how
long they last; if someone has a 1-year window, and they sign up more than 1
year after when they find out about their having Huntington's, then it will be
covered despite their knowing about it.

>Moreover, when the insurance company pays out, that ultimately comes out
>of premiums. I don't have Huntington's, but I don't mind paying an extra
>$X into a risk pool for people with Huntington's because it means I don't
>have to submit to genetic screening, either. You don't have to have
>something to hide to see it as an invasion of privacy. It's a pool of
>consumers establishing preferences, not just individual consumers v. 
>producers. The meaning of microeconomics changes as it scales.

	This would be the case if the laws in question didn't exist. If you
don't want to get genetic screening - because you have Huntington's or because
you don't like genetic screening - it should be perfectly possible for you to
make that choice, and pay the higher premiums. But it should also be possible
for someone to make the opposite choice; that's what current laws prevent. It
is not, at present, consumers establishing preferences - it's the majority
dictating its preferences to the minority.

>By "fairness" I meant that equal risks should be treated equally. Cost of
>disease A = cost of disease B. The detection of predisposition to disease
>A is politically feasible, but the same isn't true for disease B. I'd say
>you were discriminating against people predisposed to disease A, because
>they're paying into the risk pool for B, but B isn't paying into the risk
>pool for A. 

	That's an argument against any restrictions on risk. Currently, in most
states it is politically feasible to get higher rates for someone addicted to
nicotine, even if the person became addicted when they were too young to be
responsible for their own actions (generally the case). But in some of those
same states, genetic screening is banned. Aren't you being unfair to the
smoker?
	Some people argue for community risk pools, in which everyone in a
community gets the same rate. But shouldn't someone who is sicker because of
his/her own choices (e.g., chooses to have unprotected sex) pay a higher rate?
But such choices are what I'd call even more private than genetics. Whether
I've had unprotected sex in the past 5 years is a lot more intrusive a question
than whether I have any genetic diseases in my family tree. 
	Quite simply, politically unfeasible means should be removed from the
realm of politics.
	-Allen