From: “E. ALLEN SMITH” <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
To: matts@pi.se
Message Hash: 4e7a047fb9669aa2e625171467fd184b1e581a2d23430f100799ad167f0c3793
Message ID: <01I58Z8XIXP08Y50T6@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-05-29 03:29:41 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 11:29:41 +0800
From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 11:29:41 +0800
To: matts@pi.se
Subject: Re: Quickremail v1.0b
Message-ID: <01I58Z8XIXP08Y50T6@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
From: IN%"matts@pi.se" "Matts Kallioniemi" 28-MAY-1996 06:08:28.40
>Why would anyone set up a remailer at Lance's (or Sameer's) machine?
>They have remailers running already. If the thugs break root and obtain
>one remailer key from a machine, they probably get all the keys on that
>machine, compromising all the remailers in one single attack. Or am I
>missing something? Is there any benefit of multiple remailers on a machine
>where root is running his own remailer?
Well, the advantages are: A. I get Lance's help more quickly in setting
up this one, so I can later go to other machines (preferably out of the
country) and set things up the same way there (getting Mixmaster from an
out-of-US source, of course); and B. supporting the efforts of Sameer, Lance,
et al by paying them some money. While multiple ISPs are certainly
preferable (to avoid one rubber-hose (e.g., law enforcement) breaking from
getting everything), your argument assumes that all the machines at a given
ISP are linked together such that if one is broken, the rest are - which
isn't very good from a security standpoint, so I'd hope it _isn't_ the case.
>The vax pgp is available at
>ftp://ftp.net-connect.net/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/vaxpgp262.tar.Z
Thanks,
-Allen
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1996-05-29 (Wed, 29 May 1996 11:29:41 +0800) - Re: Quickremail v1.0b - “E. ALLEN SMITH” <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>