From: pcw@access.digex.net (Peter Wayner)
Date: Sat, 25 May 1996 05:32:50 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Anti-Briefing...
Message-ID: <v02140b08adcb6bbc487c@[199.125.128.5]>
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I'm sure the "Briefing" is quite impressive and it includes
several strong arguments for government surveillance. There are
bound to be more than a few kids that are alive today thanks to
eavesdropping and the quick thinking of folks in FBI, NSA et al.

That being said, I'm sure that there is also an "anti-Briefing"
that can be given that illustrates that the huge cost of
redesigning the phone system and forcing businesses and people
to operate without protection. Here are some examples from the
recent press that I think are good arguments for why strong
crypto won't change the status quo.

1) A recent video tape on the news showed some convicted bad guy
doing drugs and having sex with one of his convict buddies. They
just happened to be in a side room of the prison that had a
video camera. Some people tried to make political hay by saying
that the prisons were really coddling the prisons too much. But
prisons already have all of the enforcement tools that the
police wish they had. They can strip search people without a
warrant. They can read all of their mail and listen in to all
conversations with visitors who aren't their lawyer. But there
are still drugs in the prison. So how do they expect to
eradicate drugs in the real world?

2) There are persistent rumors that Tim McVeigh et al were under
some sort of surveillance. I know of no facts to back this up.
I've heard some people say that they feel it was part of a sting
operation that failed because the bomb actually went off. Who
knows? But the World Trade Center bombers were under
surveillance and that failed. This doesn't show that
surveillance is bad, it just shows that it isn't perfect.

3) Pachinko machines and cell phones have both used weak crypto.
Whoops. The gangsters figured out how to break the crippled
system.

There must more examples but I'm typing from memory. The point
is that full surveillance rarely stops crime altogether, but it
may make a dent. The question is whether it is worth redesigning
our phone system and computer networks to introduce even more
weakness just because the police can use this weakness.

Some might argue that if weak crypto can save one child's life
than it is worth it. This is a strong, sentimental argument, but
it really doesn't reflect the reality of the tradeoff. We could
spend a lot more money on airlines, trains and cars and save a
few kids lives, but the cost could be phenomenal. The fact is
that government enforced weak crypto is a tradeoff. We pay for
the ease of the police surveillance because we make life simpler
for crooks who make their living eavesdropping and circumventing
security systems. The big question is whether the tradeoff is
worth it.