From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
Date: Sat, 18 May 1996 18:54:53 +0800
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
Subject: Re:  SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
Message-ID: <01I4QY0BQT188Y5F2B@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
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From:	IN%"hfinney@shell.portal.com"  "Hal" 15-MAY-1996 19:23:06.71

>Maybe the operators can try to plead that they are like "common carriers"
>and should not be blamed for what people post.  Still it is going to take
>deep pockets at best to prevail in this dispute, and it isn't even clear
>that the remailer will win.  Maybe the lawyers on the list could comment
>on legal liability of a remailer used to repeatedly post copyrighted
>material, whether Scientology scriptures or Microsoft Word binaries.  I
>don't see how it can happen.

	Part of this problem may be solved through the proper decisions on
the liability of ISPs for material on them. The concept would seem to be
extensible. If a country has A. good laws on the subject and B. a pretty good
court system - e.g., one in which it's difficult to sue and easy to defend -
that country would seem to be suitable for setting up a remailer front end.
Other remailers can just be used for chaining, and can't be proven to have
carried a message (even unknowingly) without defeat of the remailer system
via traffic analysis. (A reason for remailer operators to run automatic
mailing scripts, BTW.)

>This was the basis for my suggestion that remailers may have to stop
>supporting posting of messages, and instead be used for private mail
>between consenting individuals.  Granted, this would probably eliminate
>99% of non-cover remailer traffic.  But I would argue that as long as the
>core functionality is there of letting people communicate with each other
>anonymously and consensually, we would still offer an important service.

	In other words, a remailer that would only forward mail to someone if
the email address in question gave consent? Mailing lists and mail-to-news
gateways can still be signed up by their operators under such a system, and
it's possible the remailer might be charged along with the operator if
copyrighted material was posted.

>Encryption hides the contents of the messages you send from
>eavesdroppers.  But they can still see who you are communicating with.
>Remailers extend privacy protection beyond "what you say" to "who you say
>it to".  When used with pseudonym servers and some of the extensions we
>have discussed here over the years (maildrops, etc.), they can allow the
>anonymous two-way communication that is needed for real privacy.

	How much use is a pseudonym if you can't practically use it for
building reputation capital? It's hard to do that when you can't send to anyone
but individuals, instead of to publically available sources.
	One idea would be bonded pseudonyms. If you put up an adequate bond to
the remailer front end operator (to A. pay fines and B. cover any legal fees),
then you get to send to public fora. This would also be profitable for the
remailer operator, if he/she got to keep the interest (assuming deposit into
some investment).
	-Allen