1996-05-29 - Re: Layman’s explanation for limits on escrowed encryption …

Header Data

From: Andrew Loewenstern <andrew_loewenstern@il.us.swissbank.com>
To: “Mark M.” <markm@voicenet.com>
Message Hash: 6d7bbaedc8b5d791e25448fa722383a7be71ef0cd974889058403f71a58935a8
Message ID: <9605281800.AA00525@ch1d157nwk>
Reply To: <Pine.LNX.3.93.960527203358.1163A-100000@gak>
UTC Datetime: 1996-05-29 00:15:58 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 08:15:58 +0800

Raw message

From: Andrew Loewenstern <andrew_loewenstern@il.us.swissbank.com>
Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 08:15:58 +0800
To: "Mark M." <markm@voicenet.com>
Subject: Re: Layman's explanation for limits on escrowed encryption ...
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.3.93.960527203358.1163A-100000@gak>
Message-ID: <9605281800.AA00525@ch1d157nwk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Mark M. <markm@voicenet.com> writes:
>  The normal key-length recommendation was 96 bits.  64 bits
>  and 80 bits are equivalent to 512 bits and 768 bits respectively.
>  I would guess that a 1024-bit key is about as strong as an
>  96-bit key.  The first two numbers are from _Applied
>  Cryptography_; my estimate is an extrapolation from the data
>  = in AC.

These number should be qualified with the date on which the estimate was  
determined.  New factoring techniques increase the number of RSA key bits  
required to make factoring work equivalent to a given brute-force search.

Also, I would think that the NFS makes 512 bit RSA key factoring easier than  
brute-forcing 64-bits of key space...


andrew





Thread