From: “E. ALLEN SMITH” <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
To: unicorn@schloss.li
Message Hash: 7c1248d8988ff1bfa1fb4259218de119694617ce32f1d4a746b92258994fcc8c
Message ID: <01I53O6XASPY8Y4ZAY@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-05-25 07:34:46 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 25 May 1996 15:34:46 +0800
From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
Date: Sat, 25 May 1996 15:34:46 +0800
To: unicorn@schloss.li
Subject: Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
Message-ID: <01I53O6XASPY8Y4ZAY@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
From: IN%"unicorn@schloss.li" "Black Unicorn" 24-MAY-1996 20:51:51.95
>Nothing. Perhaps block e-mail from the address the threat mail was sent
>from after a certain number of legitimate complaints.
>This, of course, depends on the threats/whatever being sent to the
>remailer in question as a 'first in chain' mailer.
It also depends on the remailer being able to tell that the messages
in question came from a particular address. If the messages are encrypted with
the keys of the other remailers in the chain (as should be the case for proper
privacy, etcetera), then there's no real way to tell for many cases. About the
only exception would be recognizable spam, all being sent along the same
remailer path (notice that lots and lots of mail is being sent from an address,
and is going out to the same other remailer).
>Ask the recipient if he or she wishes all encrypted mail addressed to his
>or her key to be supressed.
This is a version of the final remailer blocking mail to a particular
address, at least using the possible means (see above).
-Allen
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1996-05-25 (Sat, 25 May 1996 15:34:46 +0800) - Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns - “E. ALLEN SMITH” <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>