1996-05-12 - Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings

Header Data

From: “Jean-Francois Avon” <jf_avon@citenet.net>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 7f109fd0f5d0534954fe41fea28781f33ad305f9d7fa1f657ce74ea24e73b091
Message ID: <9605120112.AA02225@cti02.citenet.net>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-05-12 05:59:55 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 12 May 1996 13:59:55 +0800

Raw message

From: "Jean-Francois Avon" <jf_avon@citenet.net>
Date: Sun, 12 May 1996 13:59:55 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings
Message-ID: <9605120112.AA02225@cti02.citenet.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


> It won't make any diifference to the potential attacker.
> His aim is to recover the text/shapes of what you are displaying. He
> is not generally concerned with the "niceness" of the display, but
> rather the contents.
But of course.  But what I want to know is: is there some 
combination of 
display colors that will be visible for the eye, but not for the 
Tempest equipment?  

> Also, many guns - red, blue, green actually do
> radiate on slightly different frequencies, allowing differentiation
> of signals - due to the slightly different physical geometry of the
> guns themselves.

That might answer it.  I suppose that if some "stealth" settings 
exists, they are highly hardware dependent.  

My question was not "would it work in all instances?" but rather
"had this tactic been implemented successfully in *some* instances?"


Or, to the contrary, is it reasonable to assume that modern Tempest equipment can
work around theses impediments almost all of the time, therefore 
making any attempts at this futile?

Regards

JFA


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