From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
Date: Tue, 14 May 1996 19:43:08 +0800
To: eli+@GS160.SP.CS.CMU.EDU
Subject: Re: Transitive trust and MLM
Message-ID: <01I4OGDUWTCA8Y5BUB@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	IN%"eli+@GS160.SP.CS.CMU.EDU" 13-MAY-1996 19:59:41.90

>EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU writes:
>>	The different paths going through those different signatures will be
>>correlated/non-independent, yes.... but that isn't the problem unless you're
>>considering multiple paths (in a more complicated version).

>To determine key validity, you do have to consider all paths.  If a
>single trusted path to the bad key exists, the attacker wins.

	Hmm.... a useful distinction in this is between multiple paths with
no common elements except the beginning and end and ones with common elements.
The sections of the ones with common elements that have no common elements
can probably be treated as a subset of the larger path - a virtual link, if
you will - with its values (trustworthiness et al) determined by the paths
contained within it.

>>	IIRC, there have been some sociological studies showing that _everyone_
>>is linked through 6 or so people.

>Milgram's "small world" experiments used a much looser sort of "link"
>than we want here.  It would be certainly interesting to know how
>large a difference this makes.

	Milgram? Thanks, I'll check for that name.

>It's true that you don't need to talk to everybody.  The problem is
>that I might want to talk to people whom I don't know personally, but
>know by reputation, or by function ("DEA Rat Hotline" -- well, maybe
>not).

	I'm not disputing that... just that you don't need to be able to go
through the web to reach everyone who's got a key. Admittedly, the subsection
of people who have keys are more likely (through being more technologically
sophisticated et al, on average) to be useful to contact than those who don't.
	-Allen