From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU>
Date: Tue, 7 May 1996 12:09:05 +0800
To: jamesd@echeque.com
Subject: Re:  Kid Gloves or Megaphones
Message-ID: <01I4E3EH7JHS8Y583T@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


From:	IN%"jamesd@echeque.com"  5-MAY-1996 14:18:14.34

>>From: Lucky Green
>>>It is true that the issuer is unable to discover that double blinding is
>>>being used. The real problem with the protocol is that it requires
>>>payor/payee collusion, which may make it difficult to execute.

>At 07:58 PM 5/4/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote:
>>	Can the payee discover that the payor isn't colluding before the bank
>>can figure out who the payee is?

>If the payor is not colluding, then the payee will immediately discover
>he has not been paid, because the checksums are wrong, and his software
>says "bad payment"

>If the payor is colluding, then no matter what he reveals to the bank,
>the bank cannot discover the payee.  Note that with payee anonymity,
>the payee does not have to promptly check in his money, so the bank
>has no hope of narrowing the search by coincidence in time.

>But if the payee is colluding, then the payor can be detected by 
>coincidence in time.

	The other messages on this appear to be saying about the same thing,
with the exception of this last part. _Except_ for that, the payor/payee
collusion part doesn't appear to be a problem on the anonymnity side of
things. I would guess that Lucky Green's comment was then that there was an
additional complexity for payor and payee.
	-Allen