From: nCognito@rigel.cyberpass.net (Anonymous)
Date: Sun, 30 Jun 1996 07:30:13 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: nym.alias.net
In-Reply-To: <199606281309.PAA13151@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <199606292026.NAA08528@rigel.infonex.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


On Fri, 28 Jun 1996, Anonymous wrote:

> I would appreciate any information members may have regarding the 
> security/safety of the new nym server nym.alias.net (in "alpha" state) 
> who posted here about 3 weeks ago. Nym.alias.net reportedly is the same 
> machine as anon.lcs.mit.edu.
> 
> Specifically, is the individual running the nym _known_ to cypherpunks, 
> or is this an unknown about whom I should have serious doubts. The admin 
> states that nym.alias.net is the same machine as anon.lcs.mit.edu. 
> 
> Any information or insight regarding the wisdom of using ths nym would 
> be welcome.
> 
> Information concerning the nym I obtained by sending a message to 
> help@nym.alias.net; the administrator can be reached at 
> admin@nym.alias.net. 

Yes, nym.alias.net is anon.lcs.mit.edu.  As for whether the operator is 
trust-worthy, this is really a pointless question. With a properly 
implemented nym, the NSA themselves could be the host of your nym, and 
they still couldn't connect your nym to your true email address.

All that is required is that at least ONE of the remailers in your reply 
chain be trustworthy. 

The nym server stores only a list of nym's and the associated 
reply-blocks. Your reply block should have an absolute minimum of 2 hops, 
and each hop should be seperately encrypted with the key of the 
particular remailer. In this manner, even a corrupt nymserver would only 
be able to discern that a particular nym was using remailer X as its 
first hop. The eventual destination would be encrypted with the other 
remailer's key.  In order to compromise your nym, an attacker would need 
to compromise not only the nym server, but also all of the other 
remailers in your chain.

Persons sending mail to your nym should also use a chain of remailer's, 
if you are concerned that the nym server is interested in who is sending 
mail to which nym.

It may be helpful to have a seperate public/private PGP keypair for your 
nym, which is available for those wishing to send mail to your nym. 
Encrypting all trafic across the nymserver would protect the contents 
from eavesdropping, even if the nymserver has been compromised.




Ciao..