From: ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
To: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis)
Message Hash: c474a5f1481645a5081e3008057cb78c31bab5d6a8159f47a8c265fe40b980a9
Message ID: <199606030447.XAA22063@manifold.algebra.com>
Reply To: <N9BXoD32w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
UTC Datetime: 1996-06-03 08:05:37 UTC
Raw Date: Mon, 3 Jun 1996 16:05:37 +0800
From: ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 1996 16:05:37 +0800
To: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis)
Subject: Re: Fate of Ecash if RSA is cracked?
In-Reply-To: <N9BXoD32w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
Message-ID: <199606030447.XAA22063@manifold.algebra.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote:
>
> ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
> > scheme gets broken somehow? Suppose, for example, that someone
> > discovers an ultra-fast factoring algorithm or something like that.
>
> This'll happen, probably sooner than later.
>
Hm, how about using two public-key algorithms simultaneously (ie,
providing signatures made using two algorithms with each coins)? This
way, if one algorithm gets broken, there would be supposedly enough time
to make a transition to another method or at least honor the issued ecash.
Just curious.
Another question: what happens to the ecash issued by a bank if it's
secret keys get stolen?
Thanks,
- Igor.
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