From: jya@pipeline.com (John Young)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
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Message ID: <199606151309.NAA10039@pipe2.t1.usa.pipeline.com>
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UTC Datetime: 1996-06-15 16:31:26 UTC
Raw Date: Sun, 16 Jun 1996 00:31:26 +0800
From: jya@pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: Sun, 16 Jun 1996 00:31:26 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Dead as a Dollar
Message-ID: <199606151309.NAA10039@pipe2.t1.usa.pipeline.com>
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6-15-96. NYP Mag:
"Dead as a Dollar."
For everyone who uses cash, everyone who stores it and
everyone who regulates it, a challenge is nearing. The
challenge will be to make choices. Some kinds of
electronic currency will protect privacy, and some will
violate privacy. Some will make crime easier, and some
will make it extraordinarily difficult. Some will tax
commerce parasitically, and some will catalyze it. The
new minters of money will have enormous power to choose
-- unless consumers, on the one hand, and Government
officials, on the other, decide to make their own
choices.
In the "current climate," as those in Washington tend to
say, anything that smacks of an expanded role for the
Government is anathema. Policy makers at the Treasury
are reluctant even to talk about electronic money on the
record. "It's easy to go in and say, 'Oh, we're going to
regulate everything,' without knowing what everything
is," says a senior Treasury official. "We want to know
what everything is." He adds: "There are very serious
policy issues -- seigniorage, money laundering,
financial- stability issues, consumer issues that are
genuinely important that we must address and look hard
at. It may be sensible for the Government to issue a
card -- that's conceivable -- but what if you issue it
and nobody uses it?"
As money enters a new age, so does counterfeiting. The
ultimate threat is the perfect copy -- the virtual coin
that proves mathematically identical to the real thing.
If money is a string of bits, then someone, some where,
can make a perfect copy, and another and another. An
arms race is already raging between those working to
armor-plate digital cash with doubly and triply secure
cryptography and those working to pierce the armor.
Security experts assume that nefarious characters, in
search of an unending stream of money, are already
investing millions in the next stages of research and
development.
For every new idea in tamper resistance, there is a new
idea in tampering.... "At least you can cause people to
have to spend a lot of money," says Eric Hughes, a
cryptography expert. "But doing the second chip is far,
far less money than the first. And if you could make a
master chip that spoke the right protocol, you could
make a little money mint for yourself."
"Information warfare is going to make people very
worried downstream," says Crook at Citicorp. "We have an
immense paranoia about how dangerous it's going to be.
I think that the security requirements in our industry
are going to be more severe than at the Department of
Defense."
Cryptography is as close as modern mathematics comes to
magic.
It's simply a design choice. Smart cards, or their
on-line equivalents, could function as blindly as raw
cash. They could be even less traceable than in Chaum's
system. That is a frightening prospect to law-
enforcement authorities. Having finally made life
difficult for drug smugglers with heavy cash suitcases,
they will not casually allow the manufacture of half-
ounce chips that could make possible blind transfers of
hundreds of millions of dollars, a money launderer's
dream. Even if the Government takes no other action in
the electronic-money arena, it will surely move to
extend its restrictions on cash to cover digital
equivalents. And so far, the large institutions entering
the electronic-money arena are leaning toward
less-anonymous, less-private approaches than Chaum's,
betting that most of us will be willing to sacrifice
more pieces of privacy for, say, convenience. Chaum
could prove right, but only if the marketplace is
willing to cast its votes for privacy.
[With many remarks by Kawika Daguio.]
http://pwp.usa.pipeline.com/~jya/deaddoll.txt (48 kb)
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Thanks to JG and NYPaper.
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1996-06-15 (Sun, 16 Jun 1996 00:31:26 +0800) - Dead as a Dollar - jya@pipeline.com (John Young)