From: Marshall Clow <mclow@owl.csusm.edu>
Date: Fri, 26 Jul 1996 06:21:19 +0800
To: ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov)
Subject: Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
In-Reply-To: <199607251409.JAA16978@galaxy.galstar.com>
Message-ID: <v03007800ae1d6b7e4141@[207.67.246.99]>
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>Here's a puzzle for our game theorists.
>
>Twenty cypherpunks robbed a bank. They took 20 million bucks. Here's
>how they plan to split the money: they stay in line, and the first guy
>suggests how to split the money. Then they vote on his suggestion. If
>50% or more vote for his proposal, his suggestion is adopted.
>
>Otherwise they kill the  first robber and now it is the turn of guy #2
>to make another splitting proposal. Same voting rules apply.
>
>The question is, what will be the outcome? How will they split the
>money, how many robbers will be dead, and so on?
>
It seems to me that the last two guys in line will _almost always_ vote for killing the suggestor.

the exceptions being for extreme suggestions like "let's split the money between #19 and #20", which I figure will get voted down by #s 2 thru 18.

-- Marshall

Marshall Clow     Aladdin Systems   <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu>

"We're not gonna take it/Never did and never will
We're not gonna take it/Gonna break it, gonna shake it,
let's forget it better still" -- The Who, "Tommy"