From: ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home)
Date: Sun, 28 Jul 1996 04:01:04 +0800
To: JonWienk@ix.netcom.com
Subject: Re: Publicly Verifiable Anonymous Voting System
In-Reply-To: <199607271553.IAA28911@dfw-ix2.ix.netcom.com>
Message-ID: <199607271806.NAA12990@manifold.algebra.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text


JonWienk@ix.netcom.com wrote:
> 
> Here is the how the voting system works.
> 
> 1.  All voting information (public keys, ballots, ballot signatures, etc.) is 
> publicly available via a Web site or other similar means, and can be downloaded 
> in its entirety by anyone who cares to take the trouble to do so.  The software 
> (and source code) used to generate ballots should be publicly available as well.

or usenet

> 
> 2.  When someone registers to vote, they submit a RSA public key to a
> registered voter key database.  The public key database does not contain
> voter information; only keys.  Access to the key entry terminals is
> controlled, so that only registered voters can submit keys.  A receipt
> is given to the voter with a hash of the key printed on it (PGP
> fingerprint style), the key entry clerk's name,  a receipt serial
> number, etc., so the voter can verify the correct key was put in the
> system, and who to shoot if it wasn't.

so the authority that controls the voting knows to whom the keys belong.
When voters submit their votes, they will know who signed these votes.

I do not see how this system is anonymous.

Look into "Applied Cryptography" By Schneier, 2nd edition, Page 125.

	- Igor.