1996-07-30 - Re: “Soft Targets” as Schelling Points

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From: eli+@gs160.sp.cs.cmu.edu
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 1e9520c384946b2a3a885b1d517ec3f4b9debdc03344d3b2b3365f164a3c326e
Message ID: <199607302102.OAA11058@toad.com>
Reply To: <+cmu.andrew.internet.cypherpunks+ElzJw:G00UfAA10Qt9@andrew.cmu.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1996-07-30 23:58:40 UTC
Raw Date: Wed, 31 Jul 1996 07:58:40 +0800

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From: eli+@gs160.sp.cs.cmu.edu
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 1996 07:58:40 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: "Soft Targets" as Schelling Points
In-Reply-To: <+cmu.andrew.internet.cypherpunks+ElzJw:G00UfAA10Qt9@andrew.cmu.edu>
Message-ID: <199607302102.OAA11058@toad.com>
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Tim May writes:
>Schelling points need not involve "coordination" between actors, though
>Schelling points provide one means of coordination without communication
>(e.g., where does each think a meeting will occur).
>
>Schelling points are like "The Match Game" (an old t.v. show largely
>written by one of the main contributors to "Mad Magazine").  Namely, "Name
>a place likely to be attacked by terrorists."

This isn't EconPunks, so I'll just say I haven't seen the term used
except in the context of tacit coordination (see <http://www.best.com/
~ddfr/Academic/Property/Property.html> for some examples).  There is
some coordination here, I guess: terrorists and television crews both
benefit from being in the same place when the bomb goes off.  But this
probably isn't a driving motivation for either.

--
   Eli Brandt
   eli+@cs.cmu.edu





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