From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: 21eb8eeeed6cf51a435660eba8191c3a5c848057d570c55b3b563936989aabb7
Message ID: <ae1cf93910021004f831@[205.199.118.202]>
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UTC Datetime: 1996-07-25 21:45:15 UTC
Raw Date: Fri, 26 Jul 1996 05:45:15 +0800
From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 26 Jul 1996 05:45:15 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Schelling Points, Rights, and Game Theory--Part II
Message-ID: <ae1cf93910021004f831@[205.199.118.202]>
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Several people have sent me private mail about this interpretation of
crypto/privacy rights. (I guess they don't think a message to the list as a
whole is warranted, to save room for ninja discussion.)
As I said, my essay was an explication of my my thoughts, not a footnoted,
rigorous derivation. For those interested in looking into more on this, a
seach of the keywords will produce lots of hits. Including one at David
Friedman's site: http://www.best.com/~ddfr/Academic/Property/Property.html.
I was meeting with him several months back and mentioned my Schelling point
interpretation of rights--he immediately lit up and referred me to his
forthcoming paper. Now it is possible I was influenced by comments on the
Extropians list about this (maybe by Hanson, Price, or Friedman himself).
Certainly it was the Extropians list where I first heard of Schelling
points.
Anyway, check it out.
At 3:31 PM 7/25/96, jbugden@smtplink.alis.ca wrote:
>Basically, in this view of rights and raising of children it would seem that a
>relativistic pragmatism prevails. Personally, I think that the two choices are
>either this relative pragmatism or an absolute morality.
>
>"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."
>
>Some implications of Tim's view is that all our rights are basically a
>transitory agreement between individuals. If at any time the "cost" of a right
>becomes too high for too many (e.g. free speech leading to X for some X), then
>it is quite possible that this "right" will be removed. The "losers" have no
>higher appeal process in this matter than that of trying to gain a different
>consensus.
Partly so, but this view is _not_ the same a standard "majoritarianism," or
"rule of the herd." In liberal societies (liberal in the classical sense,
for those who only know the recent interpretation) there is a Schelling
point that says enforcing what others read is too expensive and intrusive
to enforce, and hence we will "let" others read Jackie Collins novels,
Salman Rushdie novels, whatever. Even if enough people dislike Collins and
Rushdie, the larger principle will typically make censorship impossible
(e.g., the enforcement mechanisms will not be in place).
And I have never said that people should not _lobby_ for principles of
freedom, obviously, as I am effectively lobbying in this and other essays.
>This may work while there is not a large power gap between any two individuals
>or groups, but as power shifts to fewer people and groups (economic, social,
>political, etc...) the "losers" may find that the lowest cost path is into some
>form of economic serfdom or slavery (e.g. McJobs). Ask Phil for other examples
>;-).
Even meant humorously (">;-)"), many of us would dispute the notion that a
voluntarily-taken job is a "McJob." Frankly, working at a fast-food place
is usually not a lifetime career, but is instead a way for high-school
students and others to gain work skills and to establish a "reputation"
useful for finding later jobs.
(I worked for $1.60 an hour, minimum wage, cleaning animal cages, taking
blood samples from mice, and so on. Back in high school. Certainly a
"McJob," in terms of pay and my status level, but useful in getting later
jobs.)
>Unlike Rawls, we are not in a position of developing our laws in advance of
>determining our social standing. I personally believe that our ability to
>develop reasonable laws and social structures will persist only as long as the
>majority of us have the ability to "put ourselves in someone else's shoes" and
>do in practical terms what Rawls suggests in theoretical ones.
Of course. (And Rawls would not disagree--this was his essential point.)
>As soon as those with power are not able to see a situation where they could
>become like those without power, there will cease to be motivation to
>maintain a
>"safety net" of rights or economic means to protect the "losers" of our
>society.
What are "those without power"?
The best way to help the "losers" of our economy is to allow voluntary
economic relationships to be formed.
(As an aside, the raising of the minimum wage to $5 or so will further
reduce employment opportunities for low-skilled, "starter" jobs.
Alternatives such as automation, moving offshore, or simply withdrawing
certain jobs will be attractive.)
Fortunately, strong crypto means ways to route around these so-called
"safety nets."
--Tim May
Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software!
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
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1996-07-25 (Fri, 26 Jul 1996 05:45:15 +0800) - Re: Schelling Points, Rights, and Game Theory–Part II - tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)