1996-07-13 - Re: Can’t block caller ID in Massachusetts? (fwd)

Header Data

From: Jim Choate <ravage@einstein.ssz.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: cf67ea0cb726a3a79e6364310aa9de84bc9af46c297852990569e96b8a5f2f57
Message ID: <199607130140.UAA11180@einstein.ssz.com>
Reply To: N/A
UTC Datetime: 1996-07-13 06:53:21 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 13 Jul 1996 14:53:21 +0800

Raw message

From: Jim Choate <ravage@einstein.ssz.com>
Date: Sat, 13 Jul 1996 14:53:21 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts? (fwd)
Message-ID: <199607130140.UAA11180@einstein.ssz.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text



Hi all,

Forwarded message:

> Subject: Re: Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts?
> Date: Fri, 12 Jul 1996 19:37:42 -0400 (EDT)
> From: "Michael H. Warfield" <mhw@wittsend.com>
> 
> Eric Murray enscribed thusly:
> 
> > Caller ID isn't for people, it's for businesses who want to
> > track callers.  They're willing to pay for that service, enough
> > to make it worth the while of the phone companies to spend many
> > millions on a campaign of lies (excuse me, "PR") to convince us
> > that we need CID for "safety".
> 
> number was to be able to log and track that information.  Every wonder
> about those local companies who still had you call a 1-800 number.  Guess
> what.  That was the easiest (and sometimes the cheapest) way to get ANI.
> I ran a Harris 20/20 PBX switch for a company over 6 years ago and remember
> looking over and discussing the ANI specs with the management.  We decided
> not to pursue trying to get ANI on our DID lines but the switch supported
> it and that switch was considered out of date technology at THAT time!
> 

I can verify this ability of telephone switches and number tracking. From
1984 to 1990 I worked for the University of Texas at Austin in their
Physical Plant Telco shop. I worked on a NT SL-1 based switch feeding voice,
data, and analog signals all over campus as well as interfacing to SWBT's
trunk lines.

I personaly used the system to track on campus phreak and hack attacks as
well as feeding the universities computerized security system. We used a
Charles Rivers 68/35 running building control software. With it we could
track various aspects of the telephone switch and log them offline. We used
the system strictly for input of signals for physical security (ie door
switches, mag-locks, PIR's, etc.) over the dry pair of the switch.

Watch your 6's.

                                                 Jim Choate
                                                 CyberTects
                                                 ravage@ssz.com






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