From: Hallam-Baker <hallam@ai.mit.edu>
To: “Perry E. Metzger” <cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: f6a004403b0807a246a40a81502134cfc8f70c2b08d8f77a3ce800055e30568d
Message ID: <31F3D20C.167E@ai.mit.edu>
Reply To: <4srn51$pl8@life.ai.mit.edu>
UTC Datetime: 1996-07-23 02:47:35 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 23 Jul 1996 10:47:35 +0800
From: Hallam-Baker <hallam@ai.mit.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 1996 10:47:35 +0800
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Responding to Pre-dawn Unannounced Ninja Raids
In-Reply-To: <4srn51$pl8@life.ai.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <31F3D20C.167E@ai.mit.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> > There are surely alternatives to the extremes of unilateral
> > disarmament and an arms race? For instance, slowing down the
> > race?
>
> Don't ask the question as though it is theoretical. Don't try
> answering it as though your personal values have any bearing, because
> there is indeed an objective answer here. Try doing some game theory
> simulations and see how well unilateral disarmament works.
Perry, just out of curiosity which type of game theory system are
you refering to, the standard, single shot game thoery or the
communicative model of Alker, Hurwitz and Rothkin?
As a computer scientist I would have thought you would have been
up on the idea of adding memory to game theory interactions. In such
cases the optimal outcome can turn out very differently than in the
standard model.
Claiming certainty from theoretical results is in general not a
good idea. Unless you can explain the relevance of the theory to a
situation and explain why the assumptions in the model are justified
you are not saying very much.
The fact that the US and the USSR did manage to negotiate disarmament
despite the standard game theory predictions shows that the system
is somewhat more complex than Perry's ideological view.
Briefly stated in Alker-Hurwitz a "memory" component was added into
the model. The prisoner's dilema was repeated on many occasisons in
a variety of contexts, including computer simulation and in practice.
In practice the prisoner's chose the joint optimal solution the
majority of the time.
>Oh, and don't give us stuff about how humans are above evolutionary
>pressures or nonsense like that, because we aren't any more above such
>pressures than we are above the laws of physics.
The "laws" of social scienst are not the "laws of physics". The "laws
of physics" aren't so constant either. Theoretical results should
inform the intellect not serve as a substitute for it.
If you apply genetic programming techniques to the system the strategy
that evolves is typically a cooperative one. The facts is that the
theory applied in an evolutionary context disproves Perry.
Phill
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