1996-07-26 - Re: Twenty Bank Robbers – Game theory:)

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From: Martin Minow <minow@apple.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Message Hash: fee9e1f29976b9be477b97fbea7d920130093253eba6377d70d476d69a2aec14
Message ID: <v03007802ae1eb2fed24e@[17.202.12.102]>
Reply To: <2.2.32.19960725225533.0070ca20@mail.sd.cybernex.net>
UTC Datetime: 1996-07-26 21:48:57 UTC
Raw Date: Sat, 27 Jul 1996 05:48:57 +0800

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From: Martin Minow <minow@apple.com>
Date: Sat, 27 Jul 1996 05:48:57 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Twenty Bank Robbers -- Game theory:)
In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960725225533.0070ca20@mail.sd.cybernex.net>
Message-ID: <v03007802ae1eb2fed24e@[17.202.12.102]>
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"Peter D. Junger" <junger@pdj2-ra.F-REMOTE.CWRU.Edu> notes
> a proposal by the first guy to split the
>proceeds equally among the first ten should be satisfactory to the first
>ten.

To extend this reasoning, the first person in line announces that the first
nine (in any order) to join his "coalition" will split the $2 million.
At that point, it's a win-win (or at least win-break-even) for
the entire group.

Martin Minow
minow@apple.com







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