From: TrustBuckFella <TrustBuckFella@nowhere.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 1996 13:30:11 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: TrustBucks
Message-ID: <65tr6crmj9@nowhere.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
"Robert A. Rosenberg" <hal9001@panix.com> writes:
>I fail to see why/how the initial swap of  TrustBucks(Alice) for
>TrustBucks(Bob) followed by Alice returning the TrustBucks(Bob) [as
>supposed payment] differs from her just paying with the TrustBucks(Alice)
>in the first place [ie: He is willing to accept the TrustBucks(Alice) as
>payment for the TrustBucks(Bob) that she will use to pay off her debt]. The
>net result is the same - Bob has the same amount of TrustBucks(Bob) in
> circulation and has an amount of TrustBucks(Alice) equal to Alice's payment
> [the back and forth of the TrustBucks(Bob) is just playing "Right
> Pocket/Left Pocket"].
 
I admit, my analysis is probably flawed and I appreciate you challenging
me on it. But I think it's more complex than the net result of single
transactions.
 
The way I figure it, if Bob could accept / not accept any variety of
TrustBucks, then he can manipulate what varieties he reports being able
to give in order to escape debts or manipulate what varieties he reports
being able to accept in order to keep debts unpaid (for interest,
foreclosure, etc.)
 
    For instance, Alice is paying off her credit card, which pays Bob a
    big 17% interest. Bob would rather not let her off early. "Nope, we
    aren't accepting TrustBucks( Carol ) this week. TrustBucks( Dave )?
    Let me see.... hmm... nope, sorry ma'am."
 
    For instance, Alice has just eaten at Le Cafe Bob, and is about to
    leave. Presented with the cybercheck, she "discovers" that she
    hasn't got anything Bob is willing to accept. "Sorry 'bout that,
    Bob. Ooh, hafta run! Bye bye."
 
 
So it seems to me that the simplest course is to allow payment in
exactly one variety, the payee's own. Bob can't credibly claim to not
trust himself.
 
You might object that the same problem is incurred anyways in
TrustBucks. If Bob refuses to trade TrustBucks( Bob ) for TrustBucks(
Carol ), isn't it the same thing as refusing TrustBucks( Carol )?
 
I think it's subtly different, though. If Bob can accept other people's
currency, he need not issue any himself. He can credibly refuse early
payment, since no TrustBucks( Bob ) even exist. If Bob can only accept
TrustBucks( Bob ), then Alice, who reports having no TrustBucks( Bob ),
can't "innocently" incur debts she finds she cannot pay.
 
 
 
 
>If the value is obscured there is still no verification of how much they
>have outstanding. So long as all of the TrustBucks are listed (with the
>amounts listed correctly but obscured), there is no way to verify that the
>claimed total is accurate unless you monitor their list before the swap and
>after it and there is only one new TrustBuck listed (with the correct
 
As I said, my mechanisms are probably suboptimal and possibly flawed.
That's why initially I presented TrustBucks without extraneous
mechanisms until that was objected to.
 
However, in this case the information that is wanted is whether a
certain note is outstanding or not. The sum of the list is not needed.
Indeed, one could have multiple lists for multiple identities. Or so it
seems to me.
 
Come to think of it, including the value doesn't do much.
 
 
 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.1
 
iQCVAwUBMgkhuJi7GCxryNrZAQGD+wP/QuVPojsniRdqsiqSC/vnXqBp91cJIiEl
p5cyd1dKfEvMcqW0BKB0sFq3dqFh7dEBsbDZeh17gfJnQ7oBvQgXRqhEHst0UOCd
r3+tzE5jLr7OnW1fhxo1Q2529EcEJgDA23Rp/92j7WTjJEYkb1uu2v61Uo3x00j0
XpHdq2x9jhM=
=6Onp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----