From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 1996 14:26:39 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BlackNet as a Distributed, Untraceable, Robust Data Haven
Message-ID: <ae3939990d0210040b0a@[205.199.118.202]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 2:05 AM 8/16/96, Greg Kucharo wrote:
>The only ideal I can think of would be the fictional "Port Watson".  What
>is you had a system that spanned countries, using the internet as a linking
>device.  It would be the same service.  But when you specified the kind of
>data you wanted to post, the system would route it to the appropriate
>server in a country where it wasn't illegal.
>

I have to speak up here and say that there is an actual working exemplar of
a distributed, untraceable data haven. While it lacks a robust _payment_
mechanism, that is also untraceable, so does the "Visit Port Watson"
example (which has never actually existed).

The simple structure I built in 1993 for "BlackNet" actually works. It has
been discussed in many places, and will be the subject of a couple of
sections in Peter Ludlow's new book, "High Noon on the Electronic Frontier"
(http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/mitp/recent-books/comp/ludph.html).

Features of relevance to any discussion of data havens:

* messages are posted to message pools, including any of the 18,000+ Usenet
groups copied automatically in sites around the world.

* the initial messages are in plaintext, of course, as how else could
readers determine which are of interest to them? "Anyone have details of
the medical condition of Chirac?" might be an example.

* a public key is posted along with the plaintext, thus allowing a reader
to respond _privately_ by encrypting his message to the public key and
posting it (through a chain of remailers and eventually to a mail-to-News
gateway, for example).

* this establishes two-way communication, in a "black pipe" that is visible
to all, but opaque to all but the parties.

* if some jurisdictions attempts to cut off a particular newsgroup, e.g.,
"alt.anonymous.messages," then the traffic can be shifted to other
newsgroups, e.g., "talk.politics.singapore."

* posting can be as untraceable as a chain of remailers linked to a
mail-to-News gateway can be.

* thus, two agents can establish a communications channel between
themselves without knowing the identity or location or jurisdiction of each
other.

(There are some subtle issues of man-in-the-middle attacks, as with these
sorts of protocols for establishing communication between parties who have
not met; webs of trust, again. For the several cases of communications
using BlackNet I was personally involved with, mostly in '93, this did not
ever become a problem any of us were aware of.)

* as I mentioned, BlackNet lacks a robust, untraceable payment system.
Alice and Bob may be able to connect up with each other, by exchanging
reciprocally encrypted messages in a public place, but transferring money
is problematic. (I don't know just how well the Mark Twain/Digicash stuff
really works at this time....someone motivated to actually transfer money
would be a better judge, along with the several cryptographers on this list
who've looked at it more recently and in more depth than I have.)

The important thing to note is that BlackNet, and similar systems, do not
depend on any particular jurisdiction or site to host the communications.
The anarchic, distributed Usenet is used. (And there is no reason why
mailing lists, a la Miron Cuperman's message pool list of a few years back,
or the Web itself could not be used. Using a Web site does potentially open
the owner of the URL site to charges of conspiracy, though the fact that
the messages are encrypted (after the early plaintext.)

There are certainly things yet to be done, but it's important that the
example of BlackNet be mentioned.

Solve the payment problem (for real, not the semi-GAKked version of
Digicash that Chaum now appears to be promoting) and there's no need for
"physical" data havens in Anguilla, Burma, St. Barts, Lichtenstein, or
wherever.

--Tim May

Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software!
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May              | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net  408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA  | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist         | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."