1996-09-10 - Re: BoS: Can you trust your ISP ??

Header Data

From: Eric Murray <ericm@lne.com>
To: nexus@adv.es (I~nigo Gonzalez)
Message Hash: 1ef5c11cb93429ff409de3bc41dd704124b8fca23ec7fae1348ef6492d638004
Message ID: <199609100149.SAA16682@slack.lne.com>
Reply To: <3234A158.3492@adv.es>
UTC Datetime: 1996-09-10 05:28:23 UTC
Raw Date: Tue, 10 Sep 1996 13:28:23 +0800

Raw message

From: Eric Murray <ericm@lne.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 1996 13:28:23 +0800
To: nexus@adv.es (I~nigo Gonzalez)
Subject: Re: BoS: Can you trust your ISP ??
In-Reply-To: <3234A158.3492@adv.es>
Message-ID: <199609100149.SAA16682@slack.lne.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


I~nigo Gonzalez writes:
> 
> Hello, 
>    I'm thinking about how can I get rid off this kind of attack *before* it 
> happens. Can you please send me your comments about this? I don't know so 
> much about the how SSL works, but I think this is something that can 
> happen...

[classic Man-in-the-Middle attack]


What you described is the Man In The Middle attack, often
abbreviated on these lists as MITM.  The fact that there's
an abbreviation for it should indicate to you how often
it is discussed.  However it's also one of the first
problems (besides the basic encryption) that protocol
designers think of.

It's been taken care of in SSL3- the server's certificate
must be signed by a CA that the client trusts.  Unless
the digital signature can be spoofed, and it probably
can't be, the client can be certain that the server certificate it got
is really from the server that it claims to be from.

Assuming that RSA still can't be broken, the client can be sure
that the pre-master-key material that it sends to the server
(and which is the basis for the symmetric crypto session keys)
will not be compromised.


If you grab a copy of the SSL3 spec (from netscape's web site)
and read the appendicies there's more good stuff about possible
attacks and what's been done to counter them.




-- 
Eric Murray  ericm@lne.com  ericm@motorcycle.com  http://www.lne.com/ericm
Principal, LNE Consulting: SSL, crypto applications, Internet security.
PGP keyid:E03F65E5 fingerprint:50 B0 A2 4C 7D 86 FC 03  92 E8 AC E6 7E 27 29 AF





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